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Introduction  
Although the Albanians have never given up their passionate desire for independence, 
they have been the only Balkan people really attached to the Ottoman Empire, always 
ready to support it, always happy to help strengthen it and to profit by its strength. But 
whenever the Albanians have become aware that, instead of growing stronger, Turkey 
had weakened herself, and hurried her ruin, they have risen in an effort of self-
preservation with the unanimous cry, ‘Let her commit suicide if she wishes; we intend to 
survive.’ 
The attachment of the Albanians to the Empire must not be attributed to the influence of 
the Mussulman religion, which the great majority of the population accepted when 
Albania was incorporated with Turkey. The reason must be sought in a higher order of 
national interest. – Ismail Kemal 1  
 
Ismail Kemal was a thrice-exiled Ottoman civil servant under the Sultans 
Abdülaziz and Abdülhamid II. As a loyal confidant of Midhat Pasha, he was a key figure 
in propagating liberalism and, eventually, constitutionalism in the Empire. After the 
Young Turk Revolution, Ismail Kemal served as a deputy in the restored Ottoman 
Parliament of 1908, and even served as the president of its lower house, the Ottoman 
Chamber of Deputies (Mejlis-i Mebusan), during the countercoup of 1909. However, in 
spite of his illustrious career as an Ottoman political figure, Ismail Kemal was not a Turk. 
He was an Albanian and, indeed, ardently championed the Albanian movement for 
national autonomy as its preeminent political leader. He was the chairman at the signing 
of the Albanian declaration of independence in 1912 and served as the Prime Minister 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the first independent Albanian state. While Ismail 
Kemal’s career was remarkable, the reticulation of identities as both an Ottoman and an 
Albanian, apparent in his career, was common of many Albanians at the turn of the 
twentieth century. In this sense, Ismail Kemal was a quintessential Ottoman-Albanian 
figure, whose identity existed, concomitantly, in Albanian and Ottoman spheres.  
                                                
1 Ismail Kemal Vlora, The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, ed. Sommerville Story (London: 
Constable and Company LTD 1920), 361-62. 
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His political career exemplifies the complex nature of Ottoman-Albanian identity 
as it was enmeshed with that Ottoman-Turkish identity, as a reflection of a long history of 
symbiosis and synergy between Albanians and the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, his 
personal political journey reflects an important meta-historical shift in Ottoman history, 
the nexus of which was the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, in which the historical 
cooperation between Turks and Albanians for the survival of Ottoman Empire came to an 
end. This transition was the result of the complete requisition of power, after the 
revolution, at the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress, whose political agenda 
of social and political centralization prompted Albanians and Turks to consolidate their 
identities. In so doing, both groups rejected the adaptive Ottoman administrative ideology 
that had so long sustained the multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, multi-lingual Empire, in 
favor of ethno-linguistic nationalism, similar to that that had eroded Ottoman sovereignty 
in the Balkans. For the Albanian and Turkish political leadership in the Late Ottoman 
Empire, Ottomanism, which had maintained the complex socio-political system that 
sustained the “Empire of Difference,”2 could no longer viably protect the interests of its 
peoples. For these nationalists, both Turks and Albanians would have to radically 
reconfigure their identities in order to survive the transformations underway in the 
Ottoman Empire and, indeed, in the international political order at large.  
This transitional process occurred, approximately, between the years of 1878 and 
1913. In these 35 years, I argue, a two parallel processes occurred. Albanian and Turkish 
intellectuals developed ideological arguments for ethno-linguistic nationalism in the 
wake of external threats and domestic crises facing the Empire. While, concurrently, 
                                                
2 Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference : The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press 2008). 
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Albanian and Turkish political organizations and militant groups cooperated to reinstate 
the 1876 Ottoman Constitution (Kanûn-ı Esasî, or “Basic Law”), in the hopes of 
renewing a united, just, and prosperous Ottoman Empire. I claim that the culmination of 
this process, whose origins can be traced throughout a multi-century history of 
synergistic cooperation between Albanians and Ottomans, is embodied in a single event, 
the massive demonstration, between July 5th and July 20th 1908, in the Albanian town of 
Ferizovik (in Albanian, Ferizaj) in Kosovo. This event, in which a coalition of Turkish 
and Albanian political groups and 20,000 Albanians gathered to demand the reinstitution 
of the 1876 Constitution, delivered the coup de grâce to the non-constitutional regime of 
Abdülhamid II, radically transforming the Empire’s power structure. The events at 
Ferizovik, I argue, mark both the culmination of Albanian and Turkish cooperation under 
the ideological banners of Ottomanism and Constitutionalism, as well as the beginning of 
the deterioration and eventual abandonment of this model in favor of ethno-linguistic 
nationalism.  
I intend to utilize the intellectual output of Albanian and Turkish figures 
throughout this period to demonstrate the manner in which this process, and its various 
contingencies, affected their worldviews. Particularly, I rely on works from Pashko Vasa, 
Faïk Konitza, Sami Frashëri (Şemseddin Sami), Yusuf Akçura, and Ismail Kemal to 
elucidate this process of transformation. I argue that these intellectual works provide 
crucial insight as to the manner in which Albanians interpreted the events that occurred 
between 1878 and 1913. Additionally, I claim that these intellectual sources embody a 
resolution of the meta-historical transformations that occurred during this time, the 
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proliferation of nationalism throughout the Balkans and the Empire’s effort to 
“modernize,” and the contingencies that directly effected the Albanian population.  
Unlike extant histories about the development of Albanian nationalism this thesis 
is composed with the understanding that any broad Albanian political movement cannot 
be understood in isolation from, or in opposition to, the Ottoman Empire, Turkish 
political movements and more global transformations. This thesis not only examines the 
development of Albanian nationalism, but also examines a distinct meta-historical 
transformation within the Ottoman Empire and on the international political scene, by 
concentrating on a key turning point in the process of the transformation of Europe’s last 
formal Empire into numerous nation-sates. It is in the interest of examining Albanian 
nationalism in a broader structural context, that separates the approach of this thesis from 
extant work on Albanian nationalism.   
The common scholarly approach to the Albanian national movement can be 
compartmentalized into two modes of understanding. The first, exemplified by the work 
of Stavro Skendi, approaches Albanian nationalism as an “awakening” of primordial 
national sentiments. In these narratives, Albanians, during centuries of Ottoman 
domination and oppression, struggled to attain their independence and freedom and 
finally did so in 1912. This approach, informed by modern nationalist sentiments, worked 
to revise and combat the dominance of Hoxha-era historians over the historiography of 
Albanian nationalism in the 1950’s and 1960’s. The second school of thought, which 
developed more recently, acknowledges the place of Albanians in the multi-cultural 
fabric of the Ottoman Empire, but still makes little effort to contextualize Albanian 
nationalism within a broader framework specific to the Empire.  
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These historians, like George Gawrych, set out to revise “nationalist” histories, 
but seem to miss key structures that link Albanian nationalism with nascent Turkish 
nationalism and confluence of international and domestic forces that prompted the 
broader structural transformation in the Ottoman Empire. This approach tends to 
overcompensate in arguing that harmony existed between Albanians and the Ottoman 
Empire, and neglects the seemingly paradoxical sentiments of many Albanians, who for 
most of this period asserted their loyalty to the Empire while cultivating national 
sentiments. 
 In neglecting this paradox these scholars fail to perceive the utmost importance 
of Albanian multi-vocal identities, which serve to explain the seemingly contradictory 
views of Albanian nationalists about the Empire. Understanding the multi-vocal character 
of identity in the Ottoman context is not relegated to Albanians. Indeed, in analyzing 
Palestinian identity under the Ottoman Empire, Rashid Khalidi identifies what he calls 
“competing” or “overlapping loyalties,” which correspond to the “overlapping identities” 
of many Arabs under the Ottoman Empire.3 These “overlapping identities” prompted 
certain contradictions, but they also made the co-existence of Arabism and Ottomanism, 
in the worldviews of Arabs from Jerusalem, “by no means mutually exclusive.”4 I argue 
that Albanians had a similar multiplicity of religious, ethnic, linguistic, social, cultural 
and political identities, which I describe as multi-vocal. I intend to demonstrate the 
importance of the Albanian context as a reflective microcosm of meta-historical shifts 
occurring in the Empire at large, as well as a case that complicates extant narratives of 
                                                
3 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity : The Construction of Modern National Consciousness 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 63, 85. 
4———, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism: Introduction," in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, 
ed. Lisa Anderson Rashid Khalidi, Muhammad Muslih, Reeva Simon (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), ix. 
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nationalism in the Balkans. In so doing, I hope to present the Albanian turn to 
nationalism as not only different from other nationalist movements in the Balkans, but 
also as an ideological and political reaction to the events of this period that was, in fact, a 
reaction akin to that of early Turkish nationalists.  
In the first section, I will explicate my theoretical approach, drawn from the 
works of various scholars in various disciplines, including history, sociology and 
anthropology. In so doing, I will demonstrate the advantage of employing these specific 
theories in analyzing the development of Albanian nationalism in the Ottoman context. In 
the following section, I will trace five centuries of interactions between Albanians and the 
Ottoman Empire, beginning with the earliest Ottoman conquests of Europe and tracing 
the lasting synergy that developed between the two groups. An understanding of this 
historical background is key to analyzing the deep interconnectedness of Albanians and 
Turks under Ottomanism, and the reluctance of Albanians to abandon the Empire even 
when most other Balkan communities had done so. Next, I will briefly examine the 
events surrounding the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878 and the psychological impact 
incurred by Albanian intellectuals in regards to massive military and territorial losses for 
the Ottoman Empire.  
In the subsequent section, I will trace the early ideological development of 
nationalism, beginning in 1878, utilizing the available output of fundamentally important, 
contemporary Albanian and Turkish intellectuals. Thereby, I will examine both the 
structural continuity and even mutual participation of Albanian and Turkish intellectuals 
in formulating Albanian and Turkish nationalist ideologies. This section will focus 
specifically on the works of Pashko Vasa (Vasa Pasha Effendi), Faïk Konitza (Faik Bey 
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Konitza), Sami Frashëri (Şemseddin Sami), Yusuf Akçura, and Ismail Kemal, with 
particular interest in the manner in which each reconciles nationalism (Albanianism or 
Turkism) with Ottomanism. Finally, I will investigate the importance of the 1908 
Revolution and constitutionalism as a means of galvanizing the disparate interests of 
Albanian nationalists and the CUP, using the detailed memoirs of Ismail Kemal. I will 
focus on the events of July 1908 in Ferizovik as key moment of collective effervescence 
and the last broad Ottomanist cooperation between Albanians and Turks. Additionally, I 
will consider the responsibility of the CUP in manipulating Albanian nationalists to 
participate in the revolution, without any intention of compromising their political agenda 
of political and cultural centralization.  
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Nationalism, In Theory 
In order to examine the development of nationalism as both a political and 
ideological force among Albanians and Turks in the late Ottoman Empire, it is useful to 
establish a theoretical framework. In this section I will briefly synthesize the various 
theoretical works that I find elevates my particular historical analysis of nationalism. 
Particularly, beginning with the work of Ernest Gellner, who offered a critique of one of 
the founders of modern nationalist theory, Elie Kedourie. Gellner rejected Kedourie’s 
idea that the phenomenon of nationalism seized modern society through a long 
intellectual process, beginning in the enlightenment, resulting in “an ideological style of 
politics.”5 Instead, Gellner offers a materialist model, that the fusion of culture and 
politics in nationalism is the result of an epochal shift, between agrarian and the industrial 
society. For Gellner, nationalism is the ideological expression of the material necessity of 
an industrial society, which functionally requires a mobile, literate, culturally 
standardized, interchangeable, homogenous population.6  While theoretically intriguing, 
Gellner’s approach illuminates the exceptionality of the Albanian and Turkish cases.  
For one, nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy may have originated as an 
industrial-modern phenomenon, but this epochal diagnosis does not explain the abrupt 
eruption of nationalist ideology among Albanians and Turks, both of which existed in a 
distinctly non-industrial context and had actively resisted nationalist irredentism in favor 
the imperil model of Ottomanism. The broad structural terms with which Gellner divides 
                                                
5 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th, expanded ed. (Oxford, UK: Cambridge, Mass., USA, 1993), 
140. 
6 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 33. 
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history into neat categories proves unsuccessful when considering the Ottoman context, 
which defies this categorization, as it was a non-industrial empire in the concert of 
Europe. While Gellner’s theories neglect contextual nuance in the development of 
nationalism, they are by no means irrelevant. Indeed, Albanians and Turks were 
desperate to find ideological and political means of brining their nations into both 
political and developmental “modernity,” referring to the European model of the nation-
state. As Gellner aptly describes, “…nationalism is not the awakening and assertion of 
these mythical, supposedly natural and given units. It is, on the contrary, the 
crystallization of new units, suitable for the conditions now prevailing…”7 
 Indeed Albanians and Turks were concerned pragmatically with nationalism as a 
strategic political ideology. Each group understood the nation state as the most suitable 
means of political organization for their contemporary geopolitical situation, but this 
motivation does not elucidate the nature of their respective nationalist turns. Albanians 
and Turks were reacting to more than just a change in the international order. They were 
also reacting to a series of structural shifts that occurred within the Empire in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Depending on the specific context, these 
structural, macro-ideological changes affected different individuals and groups at 
different paces and to different degrees. The Albanian and Turkish national movements 
were set in particular contexts and were motivated by particular contingencies, the likes 
of which are unaccounted for by modernist scholars of nationalism. Theorists like A.D. 
Smith and Rogers Brubaker attempt to reconcile the modernist obsession with structure 
with the seemingly authentic and ubiquitous feeling of national or ethnic sentiment in 
modern society.  
                                                
7 Ibid., 47. 
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Smith argues that a historical epochal break is insufficient in explaining 
nationalism as an ideological phenomenon of identity. He claims that the structural 
changes that occur during an epoch shift do so within the pre-existing frameworks of 
collective identities, which distinctly determine the political, social, and cultural future of 
said groups.8 In Smith’s theory, nationalism should be conceptualized by synthesizing 
certain romantic and modern nationalist theories. Thus, the importance of structural, 
macro-historical shifts are unquestionable, but they occur contiguously with certain pre-
existing kinship bonds, religious identities and belief systems. This theoretical innovation 
forces any scholar of nationalism to address particularity, in order to understand how the 
relationship between macro-structural forces and micro-contextual identities manifests in 
specific cases.9 Rogers Brubaker, who provides an innovative take on the relationship 
between the universality of ethnicity, national identity and contingency, elaborates upon 
the interplay between structure and context apropos nationalism in Smith’s work.   
Brubaker offers the important critical perspective that ethnicity, race and 
nationhood are cognitive perspectives on the world, rather than entities in the world. The 
key misunderstanding in extant scholarship on nationalism, Brubaker insists, is that the 
discourse regarding ethnicity and nationhood has been ontological, when it should be 
epistemological. Ethnic identities, for Brubaker, are merely schemas of categorization; 
they are templates for “naturalizing social difference” by partitioning the social world 
into “putative deeply constituted groups...”10 Based on cognitive research, Brubaker 
concludes that the categorization projected by ethnicity is in reality a categorization of 
                                                
8 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford, UK: New York, NY, USA, 1987), 
137. 
9 Ibid., 3-4. 
10 Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman, and Peter Stamatov, "Ethnicity as Cognition," Theory and 
Society 33, no. 1 (2004): 50. 
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“abstract entities,” that is “events, actions, emotions, spatial relationships, social 
relationships…”11 This concept is key to understanding Albanian and Turkish 
nationalism, which in both cases served as an ideological understanding that provides 
meaning to a multiplicity of contingencies with which Albanians and Turks were faced at 
the turn of the twentieth century.  
Brubaker’s theory of nationalism draws upon fundamental theoretical innovations 
from a variety of social sciences. Indeed, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s definition 
of culture is analogous to Brubaker’s cognitive understanding of ethnicity, 
The concept of culture I espouse…is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that 
man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those 
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an 
interpretive one in search of meaning.12  
 
Conceptually, “meaning” is key to understanding nationalism, as it links the relationship 
between the individual and the group to that of context or contingency with structure. We 
must understand any historical action, particularly popular revolutionary action like that 
of the Turks and Albanians at the turn of the twentieth century, as social action.  
According to Max Weber, sociology is “the interpretive understanding of social 
action,” its causes and consequences. Weber insists that study of social action is 
concerned with the manner in which “the acting individual attaches subjective meaning to 
his behavior—be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence.” An action is social, 
according to Weber, “insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of 
others and is thereby oriented in its course.”13 Thus, it becomes clear that a historian of 
social action, like the 1908 Young Turk Revolution or the Albanian national movement, 
                                                
11 Ibid.: 46. 
12 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures : Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 
1973), 5. 
13 Max  Weber, Economy and Society, trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), 4. 
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must take into account the interplay between the individual and collective meaning. As 
Weber and Brubaker insist, an apparent ideological change, like the proliferation of 
nationalism in a community must be understood the relationship between individual 
meaning, informed by structured and material, historical contingencies.  
Weber provides an analytical process he deems verstehen, the “rational 
understanding of motivation, which consists in placing the act in an intelligible and more 
inclusive context of meaning.” He continues, “…for a science which is concerned with 
the subjective meaning of action, explanation requires a grasp of the complex of meaning 
in which an actual course of understandable action thus interpreted belongs.”14 
Methodologically, the concept of verstehen informs my selection of intellectual historical 
sources as key to understanding Albanian and Turkish nationalism. As a historian, I 
claim, one cannot understand the meaning of the events analyzed below without also 
examining the meanings that individuals and groups of individuals applied to these 
various events and their circumstances. The meanings through which Albanians and 
Turks understood their identities changed based on historical contingencies: events, the 
public interpretations of events, and even reactions to the pubic interpretations of events. 
Thus to understand an ideological phenomenon like nationalism, one must attempt to 
reconstruct and interpret these “webs of significance,” and connect them to the 
appropriate events and structures. Furthermore, one must pursue the manner in which 
contingencies, events and structures provide new meanings upon which people act.  
A historical analysis of Albanian nationalism, or any nationalism for that matter, 
requires an interdisciplinary theoretical approach. Social scientific perspectives help to 
buttress historical perspectives, particularly when dealing with a concept as complex as 
                                                
14 Ibid., 8-9. 
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nationalism, with consequences that are not relegated to political, social or intellectual 
history, but have significant implications for meta-historical forces and structures. 
Indeed, as William Sewell writes, “Given the political and intellectual challenges facing 
us at the beginning of the twenty-first century, I think that history can jettison the 
conceptual and methodological heritage of social science only at its peril.”15 Thus, 
methodologically I intend to construct a history that is theoretically informed by social 
sciences like sociology and anthropology, in order to depict a better understanding of the 
manner in which nationalism developed among two unique groups in a unique socio-
political context.  
Many theorists of nationalism have hitherto left unacknowledged the intimate 
interplay of contingency and structure. Only a theory that acknowledges this relationship 
will suffice in providing a theoretical framework for a context as complex as that of 
Albanian nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire. In the Albanian case, sudden 
crystallizations of social action occur in specific events of fundamental importance to the 
development of nationalism, and yet these events are perceptibly interconnected to 
prevailing ideological and historical structures, all of which inform the worldviews of 
particular individuals. This is precisely what past scholars of Albanian nationalism omit 
in their analysis. The rapidity of collective action, the fluctuations in the national 
sentiment of groups, public life, interpretive frames, and above all the “nullification of 
complex identities” as Brubaker describes them, are most fruitfully analyzed combining 
an epistemological and “eventful” approach.16 
                                                
15 William Hamilton Sewell, Logics of History : Social Theory and Social Transformation, 
Chicago Studies in Practices of Meaning; (University of Chicago Press, 2005), 49. 
16 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed : Nationhood and the National Question in the New 
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 21. 
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 I claim that events likes the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano, the 1908 Young Turk 
Revolution, and the Gathering at Ferizovik deeply affected Albanian and Turkish 
worldviews, interrupting prior meanings and forcing individuals to construct new 
understandings, which fell into extant ideological and historical structures like 
nationalism. Only this suffices to explain the, seemingly contradictory, ideological about-
face at the hands of figures like Sami Frashëri and Ismail Kemal. These Ottoman 
statesmen and intellectuals, who long resisted nationalism typical of other Balkan-
Ottoman figures, came to view the Empire with enmity and eventually promoted 
irredentism. These events, and the way in which Albanians understood them resulted in, 
what Sewell calls, the disarticulation of extant structural network, transforming culture, 
the management of resources, and modes of power.17 As a result of these contingencies, 
Albania’s structural habitat transformed, from one distinctly within the Ottoman imperial 
structure, which they shared with Turks, to that of the nation, akin to other groups in the 
Balkans following the western European model. However, to understand the weight of 
this transformation, it is vital to understand the long history of Ottoman-Albanian 
relations, which I argue were characterized by a distinct synergism.  
                                                
17 Sewell, Logics of History : Social Theory and Social Transformation. 
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Five Centuries of Ottoman-Albanian Relations  
It is important to contextualize Albania in the mélange of the Ottoman Empire’s 
Balkan domains before 1878. In so doing, I hope to place the origin of Albanian multi-
vocal identity in the historical context of the Ottoman conquests. I argue that the diversity 
of Albanian society was augmented by the Ottoman conquests and made Albania a 
reflective microcosm of the diversity of the Empire as a whole.  I will argue that a 
synergy developed between Albanian and Ottoman social structures that prompted a 
cooperative compatibility between Albanians and the Empire.  This synergy, I claim, 
explains the hesitation on the part of many Albanians, which envisioned an 
incontrovertible kinship with the Ottoman Empire, to outright reject the Ottoman imperial 
system. In tracing five centuries of Ottoman-Albanian interdependence, symbiosis, 
collaboration, and cooperation I hope to demonstrate a deeply imbedded mutual identity, 
particularly in terms of each societies multi-vocal social structure.  
It is helpful to envision the first Ottoman military campaigns of Albanian lands as 
dichotomous. On the one hand, the desire of Ottomans to conquer the Balkan Peninsula 
was to establish gateways for further military excursions into Hungary and Italy, opening 
central Europe and the Mediterranean to Ottoman domination.  This process, I argue, was 
a sort of nexus of synergy. The Ottomans integrated Albania into their empire, which 
contributed to its diversity and forced the Empire’s administrators to compromise in a 
new social context and negotiate with new actors. Simultaneously, the imposition of the 
Ottoman socio-political system on Albanians augmented the diversity of the Albanian 
social system, which adapted to a new power structure. On the other hand, despite the 
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alleged brutality of the conquest and the resistance on the part of a handful of Albanian 
feudal lords, this complex imperial system, so often deemed the “Ottoman Yoke,” 
actually harmonized with the existing Albanian social structure, which was already multi-
linguistic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious.  
Ottoman armies, under Sultan Beyazit I, first attacked Albanian-speaking lands in 
the 1390s. Using bands of raiders, the Ottomans subdued the population and brought 
Albanian lords under their economic domain but left the local feudal structure intact. By 
1415, after a chaotic interregnum, Sultan Mehmet I sent the military to erect the first 
Ottoman garrisons throughout southern Albania, establishing direct military authority in 
the region. 18 This was followed, in 1423, by a full-scale invasion at the hands of Sultan 
Murat II, in which the Ottoman military annexed the Venetian-dominated littoral, and 
twenty-four years of revolt by the renowned Gjergj Kastrioti Skanderbeg (İskender Bey) 
ensued.  By 1431, the Ottomans established formal jurisdiction over most of Albania and 
made it into an administrative district called the sancak-i Arnavid (Albanian sanjak).19 
This is of key importance, as it demonstrates the Ottoman center’s direct influence in 
defining Albania as a stable, unambiguous territorial category, for the first time. Indeed, 
the Ottomans united Albanians into a single administrative unit, which served as one of 
the earliest examples of consolidating Albanian identity by linking the Albanian language 
to a delineated territory. This is one of the earliest examples of synergy between 
Albanians and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans, even during their conquest of 
                                                
18 Stefanaq Pollo and Arben Puto, The History of Albania : From Its Origins to the Present Day, 
trans. Carol Wiseman and Ginnie Hole (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 63. 
19 Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1967), 3-4; Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Rinehart, 
1958), 54. 
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Albanian territory, laid the groundwork for institutionalizing what would become an 
integral aspect of Albanian identity, their ties to territory.  
Indeed, the Ottoman conquest was far from a bloodthirsty, brutal military 
incursion, as it is often depicted. Albanian feudal lords, even those who refused to 
convert to Islam, maintained their privileged positions under the Ottoman timar system, 
which brought local notables into the excise-network of Ottoman authority without 
drastically diminishing their autonomy or economic privilege.20  This system reflected the 
traditional Albanian feudal system and, in fact, was comparatively appealing to the severe 
economic domination experienced under the Venetians.21 This phenomenon was the 
result of the pragmatic flexibility of Ottoman administration, which, when it was possible 
left local institutions and power structures intact. With a conscious understanding of their 
bureaucratic limitations, the Ottomans vertically integrated elites into their political 
jurisdiction, providing a remarkable degree of autonomy and demonstrating a willingness 
to adapt to diverse contexts in the Balkans.22  
Beginning in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, many Greeks and 
Serbs had emigrated from towns and villages in northern Greece and Kosovo, where 
Albanians replaced them in large numbers. These Albanians established new Albanian-
speaking communities that began to further blur the line between southern Albania and 
northern Greece and formed a significant Albanian majority Kosovo.23 Albanians seemed 
more willing to negotiate, if not cooperate, with Ottoman power in the Balkans than 
                                                
20 H. A. R. Sir Bowen Harold Gibb, Islamic Society and the West. A Study of the Impact of 
Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the near East (London: New York, Toronto, Oxford 
University Press, 1950), 46. 
21 Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912, 5. 
22 Barkey, Empire of Difference : The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, 93-94. 
23 Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 97-98. 
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many other groups in the Balkans. Even when Albanians took up arms against the 
Ottoman administration, the Ottomans’ willingness to negotiate with Albanian political 
leaders propagated a functional synergy between the two. In the mid-sixteenth century, 
when the Ottoman encountered the resistance of northern Albanian tribes to their rule, 
they negotiated the administrative autonomy and tax exemption of northern Albanian in 
exchange for a certain number of men to serve in the Ottoman military.24  Beginning in 
the mid-fifteenth century the Ottoman Empire incorporated large numbers of Albanians 
into both the local administration of Albania, the military apparatus of the Empire, and its 
highest bureaucratic posts. The devshirme, Janissary troops conscripted from Christian 
families, were comprised predominantly of Albanians.25 Albanians served as ıç-oğlans 
(pages of the palace), beys, and pashas in disproportionate numbers compared to the size 
of their population.26 Not to mention the fact that approximately thirty-six Grand Viziers 
were of Albanian origin, the first of whom, Zaganos Pasha, was appointed in 1453 and 
participated in the siege of Constantinople.27  
 In addition to the expeditious manner in which Albanians were incorporated into 
the Ottoman power structure, there was also a structural similarity between the way 
religion was conceptualized among Albanians and the Ottoman administrative policy 
regarding religion. About seventy percent of Albanians eventually converted to Islam, 
after prolonged periods of conversion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, making 
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Albanians the largest population of non-Turkish Muslims in the Balkans.28 The 
phenomenon of religious conversion had roots in pre-Ottoman Albania, which was 
constantly contended at the hands of the Orthodox Byzantine Empire and Catholic 
Western European forces, including the Vatican-backed Normans, the Kingdom of 
Naples, and later the Republic of Venice.29 Ubiquitously, prominent Albanian feudal 
lords converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism depending on when it was politically 
opportune to do so, and had little hesitation converting to Islam under the Ottomans.30  
A popular saying in southern Albanian is said to have originated from 
Skanderbeg’s father, Gjon Kastrioti, “Ku është shpata, është feja.” (Where the sword is, 
there lies religion).31 In fact, southern Albania was so religiously intermixed that, it is 
said, members of the same immediate family belonged to different faiths and they would 
attend Friday Prayers together at their local Mosque and then Mass on Sunday.32 In the 
north, men would convert to Islam in order to reap material benefits, while their wives 
and children remained Roman Catholic.33 However, despite the eventual prevalence of 
Islam even among non-notable Albanians, many of whom converted to avoid taxation 
and reap the political and economic benefits of being a Muslim in the Ottoman Empire, 
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there were other factors contributing to the unique religious diversity and tolerance 
typified the Albanian scene.34  
One of the factors contributing to this diversity is the influx, in the early 
eighteenth century, of the Bektashi Sufi order, which promulgated an exceedingly liberal, 
inclusive form of Islam, especially in southern Albania.35 The Bektashi order, often 
considered a threat to the ulema religious establishment in the Empire and the State due 
to their relationship to the Janissary ocaks, promoted non-traditional and mystic practices 
in their worship, permeated with traditions from Shia Islam and even certain Christian 
theological concepts.36 Aside from the appeal of Bektashi spirituality, the increasing 
conversions to Islam throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can also be 
attributed to the ineffective, outnumbered, and often-illiterate clergy that dominated pre-
Ottoman Albania.37 However, many scholars agree that the tolerant, universalist Bektashi 
dogma attracted many formerly Christian Albanians whose religious devotion had been 
based, historically, on political considerations. 
In addition to religion, Albania was diverse in geographical, ethno-sociological 
terms as well. North of the Shkumbin river, in the rugged, isolating Dinaric Alps live an 
Albanian linguistic sub-group, the Ghegs. Ghegs were considered quite distinct from 
their southern counterparts, the Tosks, and organized their society tribally, with a 
complex cooperative fıs (clan) system.38 The rugged terrain of the north constrained the 
Ghegs to a pastoral economic life, thus goat and sheep herding was the most prominent 
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occupation. Northern Albania was distinguished by its deeply embedded legal code, the 
Kanun-i Leke Dukagjinit or simply Kanun, which largely determined everyday 
interactions in the complex clan system, minutely regulating the social, political, 
economic and religious lives of northern Albanians, in spite of their religious affiliations.  
Indeed, even the north’s conservative Muslims and Catholics considered the 
Kanun, a sacred, immovable system essential to their everyday life, determining 
everything from marriage, to hospitable etiquette, to the infamous blood feuds 
mythologized in literature and poetry. This complex system unified Muslims and 
Catholics that often belonged to the same clans and immediate families. The Kanun 
prompted Ghegs of different faiths to enter into sacred institutions like marriage and 
“blood-brotherhood” by establishing a secular legal code with pre-monotheistic origins.39 
While culturally and geographically isolated from direct Ottoman influence, Ghegs were 
also officially autonomous, paying only a small, collective tribute to the Ottoman 
bureaucracy and electing a Boulim-başı who represented northern Albania at the Porte.40  
Inhabiting southern Albania, were Tosks, who unlike their northern counterparts, 
lived in a feudal agricultural system, which was easily incorporated into the Ottoman 
timar system during Ottoman conquests. Society in southern Ottoman-Albania was 
dominated by a system in which estates, owned by Muslim Albanian sipahis and beys, 
the commanders of sipahi regiments, were the agricultural productions centers. On the 
estates mostly Orthodox Albanians worked as laborers, while an exponentially growing 
merchant class, made up of both Christian and Muslims, developed in the cities. Southern 
Albania bordered Greece and Macedonia and it’s littoral was less than one hundred miles 
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from Southern Italy. Its proximity to Greek populations prompted a great deal of Hellenic 
cultural influence in southern Albania, particularly in education.  
Albanian society, by the early eighteenth century, was distinctly diverse in terms 
of religion, ethnicity, culture, language, economy, and social organization. This was both 
reflective of and cohesive with pre-tanzimât Ottoman society, and indeed Albania served 
as a microcosm of the Empire at large. Albanians, who were already divided along 
religious lines, adapted lithely to Ottoman millet system. This adaptation was the result of 
both the historically ambiguous religious allegiances discussed above and the adoption, 
by Albanians, of distinctly tolerant attitudes and complex, flexible, pluralistic, and 
adaptive institutions developed by the Ottomans as they incorporated vast, diverse 
peoples into their realm.41 The millet was one of the cornerstone institutions that 
distinguished the Ottoman imperial order and was key to its institutionally adaptive 
flexibility, as well as the maintenance of diversity in the Empire. 
The millets were social structures in the Ottoman Empire that bound Ottoman 
subjects to their confessional communities, particularly in terms of legal, judicial and 
administrative realms, but also in terms of identity. The millets did not become an 
institutionalized system until the tanzimât reforms, but instead functioned as, what 
Christine Philliou calls, a “fluid administrative apparatus.”42 The functioning of the 
millets is indicative of the Ottoman pre-tanzimât administrative ideology, characterized 
by decentralization, adaptability, and a willingness to negotiate apropos their direct 
power. Entrenched in the Ottoman approach to administration certainly included a multi-
dimensional notion of tolerance. This governing ideology was both a pragmatic 
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expression of the Ottomans’ desire for imperial power over a highly diverse domain, as 
well as an embedded legacy of the Islamic institution of protecting Christians and Jews 
under Sharia law, known as dhimmi contracts.43 However, this notion of tolerance took 
on its own meaning in the Ottoman context, not only as a means of maintaining imperial 
stability, but also, at its best, in the notion that the diversity of the empire contributed to 
its greatness. From very early on, the Ottomans laid the groundwork for the 
institutionalized incorporation its non-Muslim population, which would evolve, 
eventually, into a fluid system of millets.44  
 Karen Barkey defines the millet system as, the “capacious administration of 
difference.”45 This categorization acknowledges the centrality of confessional identity for 
all Ottoman subject, its institutional and administrative pragmatism, as well as the real 
fluidity of the millets.46 Through the millet, the Ottoman Empire intended to ensure 
fidelity from its non-Muslim subjects, to normalize social categorization, and establish a 
regular, comprehensible administration of taxation.47 Conceived originally by Mehmet II, 
the Orthodox millet was established in 1454 to both unify Orthodox Christians under a 
singular authority as well as to actively empower a counteragent of the Vatican.48  The 
Armenian millet was established in 1461, it placed Armenians under the Patriarch of the 
Armenian Apostolic Church in Istanbul giving them relative political autonomy and 
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acknowledging their ecclesiastical severance from the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate.49 
Furthermore, at the behest of Sultan Mehmet II the Hahambaşı (Chief Rabbi) of Istanbul 
was created around 1453. While not officially a leader of a millet, the Hahambaşı 
represented the Ottoman Jewish community to the Sultan and held legal authority over 
the Ottoman Jewry.50 
The structure of the millet was quite pragmatic in its acknowledgment of pre-
existing modes of communal organization. The adherents of a particular faith in each 
mahalle (neighborhood) utilized their local clergy as representatives to higher 
ecclesiastical authorities, who in turn communicated with the Ottoman state.51 While 
demonstrably “bottom-up” in its administrative organization, part of the function of the 
millet system was, undoubtedly, to reduce the plethora of identities in the Ottoman 
domain to broad universal categories. By categorizing all subjects in confessional 
communities, the Ottoman Empire subordinated the importance of ethnic and linguistic 
differences and gained effective administrative access to most communities in the 
Empire. Nevertheless, the decentralized locality with which the millet system functioned 
interacted gracefully with various pre-existing social structures, this is especially true of 
the highly diverse Albanian context.  
Muslim Albanians belonged to the Caliphate and shared the same rights and 
privileges as Muslim Turks, Bosnians and Arabs. As Muslims they were officially the 
most privileged community and were particularly connected to the Sultan, as the Caliph. 
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Orthodox Albanians belonged to the Orthodox or Rum millet (Millet-i Rûm) headed by 
the Patriarch of Constantinople, with Orthodox Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and all other 
Orthodox Christians. Catholic Albanians were historically a part of the Armenian millet, 
as a Roman Catholic millet was not formed. However, Catholics came under the informal 
protection of Austria-Hungary and Italy, later, they were formally protected by France.52 
While the division of Ottoman Albanians into these broad confessional communities may 
have reduced their complex identities in an administrative sense, the structure of the 
millet was largely successful. It was decisively localized and decentralized, which served 
to connect the vast number of peripheral Ottoman subjects to the administrative center. 
The decentralized millet system allowed Albania to maintain its heterogeneous character 
largely unencumbered. Each distinct community, down to the local parish and 
congregation, communicated with the larger bureaucratic system through one of their 
own. These clergymen both spoke the local dialect and, more importantly, had direct 
access to the most local concerns of the population.  
Military Defeat, Reform and Social Disruption  
The pragmatic flexibility and institutional adaptability of the Ottoman 
administration had functioned capably for almost four hundred years. However, the 
strikingly decentralized military and administrative structures that had sustained Ottoman 
control over its vast territory, became gradually strained. Beginning in the eighteenth 
century, there was an increasingly apparent necessity for large-scale systemic reform in 
the Empire, particularly in the realms of the military, trade, and bureaucracy.  
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I maintain that the inauguration of reforms is further evidence of the consistent 
pragmatism and adaptability that had long been the root of Ottomanism as an 
administrative ideology.53 This is in spite of the insistence of many diagnostic historians 
that these reforms serve as an indication of the Empire’s overall decline. Indeed, the 
Ottoman State was confronted with new challenges in the eighteenth century including 
internal irredentism and persistent military provocations from European powers. The 
Ottomans, thus, launched a campaign of rapid reform and centralization that, while 
contiguous with the pragmatism of Ottomanism, significantly transformed the 
countenance of the Ottoman administrative ideology.54 Indeed, the eighteenth century 
marked, not the beginning of a declining empire, but the transformation of an empire into 
a modern state. Despite genuinely pragmatic intentions, and perhaps even the strategic 
necessity, these reforms considerably disrupted the synergistic cohesion that had 
flourished with many of its subjects, in no case is this more apparent than with the 
Albanians.  
The eighteenth century began in the wake of a significant event in Ottoman 
history, marking the initiation of a slow but persistent process, in which the Empire’s 
European territories were annexed. In 1699, the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of 
Karlowitz, ending what Europeans had referred to as the “Great Turkish War” between 
the Ottomans and the Holy League, comprised of the Holy Roman Empire, Russia, the 
Commonwealth of Polish-Lithuania, and the Republic of Venice.55 The Treaty of 
Karlowitz was the first time that an Ottoman Sultan had officially acknowledged the 
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permanent abdication of Ottoman territory, relinquishing Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Dalmatia, Morea, Podolia, South Ukraine, and some of the Aegean Islands to 
the various members of the Holy League.56  
The rest of the eighteenth century was marked by a consistent struggle between 
the Ottoman military and various bordering powers vying for territory, the 1718 Treaty of 
Passarowitz, the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, and the 1792 Treaty of Jassy brought 
about massive territorial losses for the Empire.57 By 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte had 
invaded and occupied Egypt, marking the beginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire’s 
control over the crucial territory. For many historians, the crisis in Egypt marked the end 
of a century marred by failed Ottoman military enterprises and humiliating territorial 
losses, and the beginning of Ottoman decline.  
However some scholars have offered alternative analyses that challenge these 
dominant decline-narratives. Karen Barkey characterizes the events of the eighteenth 
century as “a struggle over the definition of the political,” demonstrative of the Empire’s 
capacity for adaptation that transformed the nature of the state.58 For Barkey, the 
eighteenth century was marked by systemic transformations in the relationship between 
politics and society, enacted both “macrohistorically” and locally by specific actors. For 
example, the mounting importance of the kapı or household was a means of political 
organization apart from the palace that took the form of local patronage networks. These 
networks were instrumental in transformative events, such as the 1703 rebellion that 
removed Sultan Mustafa II. Major reconfigurations of the Ottoman social structural 
                                                
56 Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922 (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 38. 
57 Ibid., 40. 
58 Barkey, Empire of Difference : The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, 197. 
  Licursi 31  
 
seemed to merely occur; the Empire’s periphery was increasingly horizontally integrated 
into the state. Notables served as the main progenitors of reorganization whether as 
irredentists attempting to gain autonomous power like Mehmet Ali or those notables 
along with the ulema and Janissaries who in 1703 “marched to Istanbul to save empire 
and sultan.”59 Reform in the eighteenth century, it seemed, was almost organic, as 
different actors and institutions began to rearticulate their political organization and take 
a more active role in the destiny of the Empire. 
This political transmogrification occurred concomitantly with what Barkey deems 
two “metahistorical developments,” that is the commercialization of the economy and the 
introduction of life-term tax farming. These economic innovations, according to Barkey, 
marked not the beginning of decline, but the beginning of a “transitional mode” from 
empire to “modern” state. The expansion of long-distance trade and tax farming provided 
opportunities for privatization, which precipitated, according to Barkey, “enclaves of 
modernity.”60 While, as Philliou rightly claims, “in trying to capture the levels of 
unarticulated change in the Ottoman Empire to project the term modernization or 
modernity is to accept its many implications about twentieth-century paths to 
development,” it is nonetheless useful to understand these as fundamental political 
transformations.61  
This transformational phenomenon augmented the power of the local notables 
managing complex political, social and economic networks, leading to a sort of 
decentralized, independent process of change that resembled the “European experience of 
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modern[ization]…”62 I argue this is key, not only to disrupting narratives of decline that 
ignore this exciting period, but also to understanding the earliest historical roots of 
nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. The political and administrative transformation of 
the Empire must not be understood as relegated to state-run, programmatic, centralized 
efforts. Instead this complex process can be traced in peripheral localities, at the hands of 
local actors and institutions that transformed, both materially and conceptually, the 
relationship between politics and society within the Empire.  
The struggles of eighteenth-century Albania should be contextualized within this 
important transformative process. The subtle shifts of power, that occurred both 
internally and externally, and the motives of numerous actors manifested to determine 
both the fate of Albania within the Ottoman Empire. This includes socio-historical 
developments that affected the countenance of Albanian nationalism. And like the 
Empire as a whole, the complexity of the Albanian socio-political landscape was subject 
to a sort of organic transmutation at the hands of various actors and forces.  
One of the central conflicts in Albania, during the eighteenth century, was over 
the religious identity of Albanians. Throughout the eighteenth century, various actors and 
institutions competed for influence over segments of the Albanian populous evoking 
religious authority and manipulating religious difference. Military conflicts between the 
Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary and Venice in the late seventeenth century 
transformed into a competition over the loyalty of Albanians, a process that was 
complicated by the fact that religion was the primary source of identity for Ottoman 
subjects. For instance, Catholic clergymen, many of whom were sponsored by Austria-
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Hungary or Venice, prompted their Albanian congregations to take up arms against the 
Ottoman military and Ottoman administrators during these military conflicts.63 
This phenomenon was answered, by the Ottoman administration, in the form of 
forced conversions of Albanian Christians to Islam, as well as mass deportations of 
Albanian Catholics, from northern Albania, a number of which had taken up arms against 
the state.64  This initiated a fundamentally important conflict, for Albanians, over their 
social identity and political reality. Albanians, for the first time, were truly compelled to 
consolidate their identities, in order to clearly demarcate their political and socio-cultural 
loyalties within Albania itself, as well as in the larger constitution of the Empire, and 
indeed the international order. This was a decidedly modern phenomenon, in which 
Albanians had to consolidate their amorphous, multi-vocal identities into a concrete 
religious affiliation, which had implications, not only for their political loyalty, but also 
for their cultural and social identities. With the eighteenth century initiated a two hundred 
year process, in which Albanians were constantly positioned to reconcile their certain 
aspects of their identities, negotiate with various institutions of power and reevaluate 
their various loyalties.  
The Orthodox Church was one of the most active institutions in the early phases 
of this process, initiating a campaign to Hellenize southern Albania, particularly by 
establishing Greek-language elementary and secondary schools, called gymnasia, 
throughout the eighteenth century. The central figure of this campaign was the Greek 
monk Kosmas Aitolos who is said to have founded two hundred Greek elementary 
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schools in southern and central Albania, before his death in 1779.65 The Hellenization 
campaign was not merely the result of the Patriarchate’s desire for hegemony in the 
Balkans, but also a strategic maneuver in a competition grounded in the Russo-Turkish 
wars starting in 1768.66  
One aspect of this competition manifested in conflicting claims to religious 
legitimacy in the Balkans between the Russian Empire and the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople. During the war, the Russian Empire sent agents, like Alexis Orlov, into 
the Balkans to insight rebellion among the Orthodox population, threatening the power of 
both the Patriarchate and the Ottoman administration. One of the results of the Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca, ending these wars in 1774, was Russia’s claim to serve as protector of 
the Orthodox population within the Empire, as it gave all Orthodox Christians the right to 
sail under the Flag of the Russian Empire. This treaty was a key turning point in Ottoman 
diplomatic history as it established, through a diplomatic treaty, the legitimacy of 
potential interventions in Ottoman territory by the Russian Empire.67  
 In Albania, the treaty encouraged Greek proponents of Orthodoxy to assert the 
authority of the Patriarchate more aggressively, by strictly enforcing the liturgical and 
educational use of the Greek language in southern Albania. For instance, in the semi-
autonomous, southern Albanian city of Voskopojë, which served as an important 
international commercial and intellectual center, portions of the population had staged a 
rebellion in support of Russia in 1769. The official reactions to the treachery in 
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Voskopojë are telling as to the importance of Albania as an Ottoman domain. The 
Ottoman state had ordered Muslim Albanian derebeys (feudal lords that largely replaced 
sipahis) to attack the city and violently suppress the rebellion. On the other hand, the 
Patriarchate decided to allocate resources to founding a Greek secondary school called 
“The New Academy,” which opened in 1774 and rivaled some of the best high schools in 
Greece.68 While the Ottoman administration dealt severely with the rebellion in 
Voskopojë, the Patriarchate, which served as the political and administrative arm of the 
Ottoman Empire into the Orthodox communities, utilized soft power to arrogate control 
over the Albanian population. Indeed, by encouraging Hellenic culture and the use of the 
Greek language in educational and religious settings, the Patriarchate was serving to 
bolster, not only their own power, but also that of the Ottoman Empire.   
In Albania, the eighteenth century was characterized by the contestation of 
various institutions for authority and legitimacy among Albanians. These power brokers 
abruptly entreated Albanians to consolidate their multi-vocal identities, by demanding 
their loyalty to one institution versus another. While some historians have argued that this 
went on without the participation of ethnic Albanians, and in spite of Albanian interests, 
there is evidence that Albanians had agency in the matter. For instance, many of the 
derebeys and Ottoman authority figures in Albania were Albanian Muslims, while many 
Orthodox Albanians actually welcomed Hellenization, particularly in their schools.69 
Many southern Albanians willingly incorporated Hellenic culture in their identity, even if 
it was at the behest of Orthodox clergymen. One result of Hellenization in the eighteenth 
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century was the sudden appearance, among southern Albanians, of given names derived 
from the Greek language, pagan mythology, and other Hellenic traditions.70  
Throughout the eighteenth century, the undulating relational networks, negotiated 
within the complex socio-political framework of Albania, were reflective of those shifts 
occurring in the Empire at large. Even during turbulent times, the fluctuating notions of 
power and politics in the Empire at large were reflected and manifested in the local 
Albanian context. The Ottoman policy, regarding the governance of its periphery, had 
historically consisted of delegating responsibility to a network of timariots and sipahis. 
However, the sub-contracting of these duties to local notables and derebeys and the 
proliferation of tax farms allowed a small elite to wield a great deal of power throughout 
the Empire. In Albania, two particularly powerful notable families monopolized power in 
the eighteenth century, the Bushatis in the north and the family of Ali Pasha Tepelena in 
the south.71  
Beginning in 1788, Ali Pasha, who had served the Sultan in various military 
conflicts, was recognized, by the Porte, as the governor of Yanya (Janina) sancak. Ali 
Pasha, a Greek and Albanian speaking Muslim with ties to Bektashi Sufism, had risen 
quickly through the Ottoman military ranks and at one time commanded one of the 
largest groups of Albanian janissaries. Like many powerful notables, Ali Pasha took 
advantage of Ottoman weakness in the eighteenth century and consolidated power in a 
territory expanding throughout southern Albania into parts of Macedonia and Greece. 
Nicknamed, by Lord Byron, the “Muslim Bonaparte,” Ali Pasha administered his 
territory with a particular political dexterity, manipulating the Porte and various European 
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powers alike. He managed many external threats including that of Napoleon’s army 
stationed on the Ionian Islands, with whom he negotiated an alliance and, allegedly, 
cultivated a friendship.72 Ali Pasha’s court proceedings were conducted in Greek, and he 
is known to have surrounded himself with some of the brightest Greek minds of his day.73  
While Ali Pasha actively promoted and subsidized Greek education, he dealt with 
internal threats from dissenting Himariots and Suliots with the utmost brutality.74 Ali 
Pasha exercised remarkable control over the western Rumelia for decades, exploiting the 
weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire’s decentralized administrative system. 
However, the meta-historical transformations of the eighteenth century, which 
gave rise to figures like Ali Pasha, forced him, and those of his like, into direct conflict, 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the systemic, transformative 
centralization efforts of Sultan Mahmud II. Beginning in 1808, Mahmud II was dedicated 
to disintegrating the power networks of the dominant pashas and derebeys throughout the 
Empire, in favor of centralizing power in Istanbul. Of particular interest, to Mahmud II 
was the Bushati family, all of whom were exiled in 1831, not to mention Ali Pasha who 
was decapitated, and whose head was allegedly delivered to the Sultan in 1822.75 By this 
time Mahmud II had dealt severely and rather successfully with many of these powerful 
figures and his program of centralizing reform was well under way.  
The first half of the eighteenth century was a forbiddingly threatening time for the 
Ottoman administration. These “fraught decades” Christine Philliou deems the historical 
“black hole between tolerance and violence,” as they are the, largely overlooked, 
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temporal origin of key trajectories of the Late Ottoman history.76 Beginning in 1821 
uprisings in the Danubian Principalities spread throughout Greece, Macedonia and Crete. 
The organized rebellion in Greece was received as a devastating blow to the Ottoman 
center, which responded by violently dismantling Greek power networks in Istanbul and 
even hanged the Patriarch.77 The reaction of European powers to the revolution 
elucidated their position regarding the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire over the 
Balkans. It was clear that, for the most part, the European powers were, in the best case, 
ambivalent to Ottoman sovereignty and, in the worst case, actively encouraging 
irredentism within Ottoman domains.78 The inability of the Janissary corps to protect the 
Ottoman state from Greek rebels, particularly in the earliest uprisings in Moldovia, 
embroiled a conflict between the Ottoman Center and the corps, which ended in its 
violent abolition in 1826.79   
Furthermore, Mehmet Ali had annexed Egypt and his army had captured the 
Hejaz, threatening the Sultan’s legitimacy as the keeper of the Two Holy Cities of Islam. 
By 1833, he was marching north into Anatolia with the express desire to remove Sultan 
Mahmud II.80 The Sultan was concurrently attempting to institute a massive series of 
reforms, an effort that continued in the tanzimât. The 1839 Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayun, 
issued by Sultan Mahmud II’s son Abdülmecid I, signified a foundational overhaul of the 
Ottoman State and the countenance of Ottoman civil society. The reform initiatives 
included legal equality of all citizens, a standardized uniform system of conscription, a 
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drastic reformation and standardization of the tax system, which began with Sultan 
Mahmud II. Perhaps most significantly, the inclusion of a phrase that indicated deference 
to European models of the modern state: the guarantee of life, honor, and property for all 
Ottoman subjects. Not to mention other signifiers of the modern nation-sate, which were 
included in the edict, including the adoption of a standard flag and national anthem.81  
 These reforms, particularly with regard to taxation, opposed the interests of 
powerful derebeys, pashas and other notables who were willing to go to war with the 
Empire to maintain the status quo. The state, however, was anything but impotent in their 
insistence on reform. In 1830, Mahmud II had sent Mehmet Reshid Pasha to destroy the 
fortified garrisons of the powerful Albanian notables, in order to clear the way for the 
new centralized bureaucratic system. Infamously, in August 1830, Reshid Pasha invited 
the beys and ağas of southern Albania to a fraudulent reward ceremony, in Manastır, for 
their service in fighting Greek revolutionaries.  However, rather than rewarding them, he 
slaughtered five hundred of the most powerful Albanian notables in a single evening.82  
Militarily successful, the Ottomans commenced a drastic overhaul of the Albanian 
political system. They replaced the mercenary armies of these derebeys and other 
notables with official, compulsory ten-year-term Ottoman military units, known as 
nizams. Additionally, the old sub-contracted taxation system was replaced with a new 
system, in which official Ottoman bureaucrats acted as tax collectors.83 With the 
introduction of the 1839 Hatt-i Hümayun, Albanians saw a great threat to the relative 
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autonomy that they had enjoyed during the centuries of Ottoman rule. A nearly consistent 
string of rebellions throughout the rest of the 19th century commenced.84   
Key to understanding the significance of the reforms is the degree to which the 
adaptive, decentralized governorship by the Ottomans satisfied the needs of the internally 
diverse Albanian society. Indeed, the malleable adaptability of Ottoman governance was 
key to the predominately stable 500-year bond, as it satisfied the of both the Empire’s 
desire for strategic territorial power in the Balkans and the multiplicity of particular 
Albanian interests. With the centralizing effort came significant unrest from both 
Albanian peasants, who, in addition to new taxes, had to satisfy a decade-long military 
term and the former notables whose prominence was significantly threatened by the new 
reforms. Despite revolts, the reforms were introduced resulting in a significant shift of 
power from the agricultural estates to the towns. Merchants, as a result, gained power as 
intermediaries between commodity farmers and the state. Additionally, Ottoman 
bureaucrats replaced Albanian local notables, which significantly upset embedded 
systems of power.85  
One of the most significant reforms resulting from the tanzimât was the 
bureaucratic partition of the Albanian sancak into multiple, isolated vilayets. Beginning 
in 1836 and codified in 1865 Ottoman Albania was geographically divided into four 
bureaucratically isolated vilayets: Kosova (central north-eastern), Yanya (southern), 
Manastır(southern central) and İşkodra (northern).86 The reformation of Ottoman 
administrative districts had apparent origins, ideologically, in the modernization of 
bureaucratic institutions embedded in the tanzimât reforms. However, many Albanians 
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felt that the Ottomans wanted to disintegrate the geographical unity of Albanian speaking 
lands in order to impose Ottoman hegemony.87 Indeed, the tanzimât reforms prompted 
important foretelling conflicts that would characterize Ottoman-Albanian relations for the 
next several decades. That is, the manifestation of severe discord between Albanians and 
the Ottoman Empire as a result of widespread reforms propagated by the Ottoman center.  
Furthermore, these reforms occurred concurrently with increasingly nationalistic 
unrest in the Balkans, with successful revolutions in Greece and Serbia and burgeoning 
movements in Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Macedonia. The concurrence of a 
newly imposed centralized state structure affecting local Albanian social structures and 
an increasingly threatening notion of expansionist-irredentism couched in pan-Hellenic 
and pan-Slavic terms represented a serious threat to Albanians. The centralizing reforms 
had served to alienate Albanians from the Porte, while nationalism in the Balkans had 
served as a menacing reminder to Albanians of their precarious position. It was clear that 
the pre-tanzimât Ottoman society, in which Albanian society had flourished, was under 
siege both at the hands of internal reformers and acquisitive neighbors.  
The Albanian case is different from that of the rest of the Balkans, despite the 
religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity of the region. Albanian society, more than any 
other Balkan community, reflected the complex social structure of the pre-tanzimât 
Ottoman Empire. In terms of religion, the Balkans was eighty percent Christian, whereas 
Albania was, depending on the time between seventy and eighty percent Muslim.88 
However, I do not agree with many historians of Albania that religion is the key to the 
Albanian affinity with the Ottomanism. Rather, I claim, it is the historically ingrained, 
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complex social patterns that dominated in both Ottoman and Albanian societies, which 
made them synergistic. Indeed, it is the disintegration of Ottomanism as a complex social 
system in both internal reforms and external attacks that laid the foundations for the 
development of Albanian, as well as Turkish, nationalism.  
Crisis and the Provenance of New Nationalisms 
 With Albania’s place in Ottoman history firmly established, I will narrowly focus 
the temporal scope to the decade that saw the origins of Albanian nationalist sentiment. 
Albania in 1870’s maintained its status as a microcosm of the diversity emblematic of the 
Ottoman Empire. In these years, about one million Muslims (with twenty Bektashi teqes 
or lodges), three hundred thousand Orthodox Christian, and one hundred and eighty 
thousand Catholics lived in Albania.89 In cities like Manastır, where there were twenty-
four mosques, five churches, and nine synagogues, Albanians lived peacefully with 
Turks, Greeks, Jews, Bulgarians, Armenians and Wallachians.90 However, in spite of this, 
many Albanians were indignant in regards to the Ottoman response to burgeoning 
conflict in the Balkans and the issuance of the 1839 and 1856 tanzimât reforms. 
Exacerbating this situation was a crop failure in 1873, the rebellion in Herzegovina in 
1875 followed by the deleterious Bulgarian insurrection or “April Uprising” in 1876, 
which brought about Sultan Abdülaziz’s deposition the same year.91  
In December of 1876, at the Aynalıkavak kasrı (pavilion of the mirrored poplar, 
also known as the Tersane Palace) in Istanbul, representatives of Great Britain, the 
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Russian, French, German, Austro-Hungarian Empires and the Kingdom of Italy conferred 
to address the crises in the Balkans.92  The six powers had previously drafted a document 
proposing three new semi-autonomous vilayets, Bosnia, East Bulgaria, and West 
Bulgaria.93 On December 23, the opening day of the Constantinople Conference (or 
Tersane Konferansı), cannons were fired and an announcement was made that Sultan 
Abdülhamid II had appointed the famed liberal reformer, and delegate to the conference, 
Midhat Pasha to the position of Grand Vizier and publically ratified a constitution.94 The 
spectacle and timing of this event made it more than a mere preemptive appeasement of 
the European powers. Rather, it was an assertive and bold maneuver at the hands of the 
Ottoman center. In adopting a constitution the Ottomans were asserting a normative 
sovereignty compliant with the alleged political and philosophical values of Europe. As a 
constitutional state, they avowed legitimacy, asserted their equality with the European 
powers, and insisted upon their rightful jurisdiction over the Balkans. Thus, any decision 
regarding these areas or their associated uprisings would have to follow the legal 
procedure according to the constitution and go before a parliament, delegitimizing the 
Conference.  
While this deft diplomatic scheme allowed the Ottomans to assert agency in the 
international political arena, the powers were insistent on the Sultan meeting their 
demands. When Midhat Pasha formally rejected the proposed measures, the Russian 
Empire declared war. The Russo-Turkish War, which lasted from April 1877 to March 
1878, was fought in the Ottoman domains of the Balkans and Caucasus, in which the 
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Russian military made significant territorial advances. The war ended on March 3, 1878 
with the Treaty of San Stefano (now called Yeşilköy), the provisions of which proved 
humiliating for the Empire.95 Not only did the treaty grant independence to the Ottoman 
domains of Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania, but it also established an autonomous 
Bulgarian territory, similar to the one proposed at the Conference of Constantinople, but 
encompassing a larger territory and holding the right to establish an army (See 
Appendices A.1 – A.3).96  
 Albanians may have been the only group in the Empire that reacted to the Treaty 
of San Stefano with more fear and urgency than the Ottomans themselves. While the 
treaty was a sinister humiliation for the Ottoman center, for Albanians it brought the 
borders of fervently nationalist, heavily armed, and acquisitive Bulgarian, Serbian, 
Montenegrin, and Romanian independent governments to their back door.97 Not to 
mention the fact that the Albanian-speaking areas of Prishtinë, Dibër, Korçë, Rugovë, 
Ipek, Antivari, Dulcigno, as well as portions of the lake of Shkodër and the river of Buenë 
were to be annexed and divided between Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro.98 
Furthermore, Abdülhamid II had suspended the brand-new Ottoman parliament and thus 
the 1876 constitution, that just one month earlier, which undoubtedly exacerbated the 
uneasiness of both Albanians and Turks apropos the dire situation of the Empire. Abdul 
Frashëri (brother of Naim and Sami Frashëri), who served as an elected representative of 
the Yanya vilayet in the first Ottoman parliament, founded an organization with the 
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interest of arming Albanians to prevent “the detachment of their lands from Ottoman 
rule.”99 The clandestine Committee for the Defense of Albanian Rights was based in 
Istanbul, with a membership composed of Albanians prominent in the Ottoman center 
like Sami Frashëri and Pashko Vasa, a Catholic Albanian and Ottoman diplomat and 
statesman.100  
The Committee was the first group of Albanians that was organized around 
concern regarding the San Stefano Treaty and the possible ineptitude of the Hamidian 
regime to ensure the territorial integrity of Albanian lands. Meanwhile, in Albania, 
groups of Albanians, mostly Kosovars, whose land was fatally undermined in the Treaty, 
had begun to organize militant bands to defend themselves from encroachment, 
particularly at the hands of the Serbian military.101 Abdul and his Committee allied 
themselves with these more militant factions in an official meeting at a mosque in the city 
of Prizren in Kosovo.102  
On June 10 1878, an alliance was formed between the Istanbul elites from the 
Committee for the Defense of Albanian Rights and the armed mountaineers, tribal chiefs 
and landowners that had organized in Kosovo. The delegates initiated a besa (oath) 
promising to raise money for arming bands to protect Albanian lands, to petition the 
Congress of Berlin, to create an Albanian League (or the League of Prizren) which would 
act as the organizational backbone of the movement, and to strive for a new Albanian 
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vatan within the framework of the Empire.103 The Resolutions (or karaname) of the 
Prizren Committee for National Defense, which were approved by forty-seven Albanian 
beys on June 18th, was the first manifesto for the broader Albanian national movement. 
These resolutions illuminate the foundational framework from which the Albanian 
nationalist movement developed. They reflect the complex relationship between 
Albanians and the Ottoman state and religion, as well as embodying the earliest desires of 
Albanians for reform in the Empire and increased autonomy.  
 For instance the first article reads as follows, “Our league has come together to 
oppose any government other than that of the Sublime Porte and to defend our territorial 
integrity by all possible means.”104  This article establishes a key dichotomy that not only 
pervades the rest of the resolutions, but also was a fundamental point of contention for 
Albanian nationalists for decades to come. Albanians had to reconcile their loyalty to the 
Sultan and their desire to assert their cultural and political autonomy within the Empire. 
Most of the delegates at the League of Prizren were Muslim Kosovars, for whom the 
Sultan was a sacred imperial authority, both politically as the guardian of Muslims in the 
Balkans, and religiously as the Caliph of the Faithful and Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosques.  
This sentiment was reiterated in the second article, which stated, “It is our most 
earnest intention to preserve the imperial rights of our Lord, the irresponsible person of 
His Highness the Sultan.”105 The delegates at the League of Prizren were sure to profess 
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incontrovertible loyalty to the Sultan, and to the Empire and religion upon which his 
power rested. From the first two articles alone, it was clear that from the state the 
Albanian national movement, in so far as it was institutionalized in the League of Prizren, 
envisioned itself as a sort of organ of defense of the Sultan’s rightful reign in Europe. In 
this sense, Albanians with desires for advancing their national interests, saw no 
contradiction in defending, concomitantly, the interests of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, 
for the delegates at the League of Prizren, the interests of the Albanian nation and the 
Ottoman Empire were one and the same.  
Despite the fact that most delegates at the League of Prizren were Muslim nobles 
and tribesmen, they were sure to avoid alienating non-Muslim Albanians. In fact, the 
resolutions, reflect a distinctly Ottomanist religious tolerance that demonstrates a further 
ideological affinity between the League of Prizren and the Ottoman state. The fourth 
article reads, “In accordance with our noble religious law [Şerîat], we will protect the 
lives, property and honor of our loyal non-Muslim compatriots as our own…”106 Again, 
the language of this article reflects a precise replication of Islamic religious tolerance as it 
was codified by the Ottoman state, employing the same language of “life, property, and 
honor” as the 1839 tanzimât reform, the Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane.107  
The use of this particular language is of fundamental importance. The article 
appropriates the manner in which the Ottoman state reconciled the Islamic institution of 
protecting the Ehl-i Kitap (People of the Book, Christians and Jews) and a Western 
European understanding of religious tolerance, in a secular, legalistic sense. Indeed, the 
Ottoman state demonstrated in the Hatt-i Sharif its ability to satisfy European demands 
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for reform in an extant Islamic legal framework and concepts of justice derived from 
“medieval Muslim political thinking.”108  In adopting similar language, the League of 
Prizren not only attests to its Ottoman character, but also references and, in a sense, 
enacts the “rights” codified in Hatt-i Sharif. Thus, with an impressive tact, the League of 
Prizren asserted its loyalty to the Sultan and its interest in defending the Ottoman Empire, 
while simultaneously using distinctly Ottoman concepts to organize to assert and defend 
their “rights,” as they interpreted them. As the final article states, the Albanians at the 
League of Prizren were “willing to shed blood for Empire, their nation and their 
fatherland…”109 However, it was up to the League of Prizren to determine the interests of 
their nation, and in this sense there was open-endedness to the resolutions of the League 
of Prizren, as if the delegates had prepared for a potential contradiction in the interests of 
their Empire and their nation.  
 The League also relied on Islam, in addition to Ottomanism, as a source of 
conceptual legitimacy. In the same way that the Ottomans negotiated Islamic legal 
practice with the institution of a functioning government to which subjects must be loyal, 
the League of Prizren invoked Islam to legitimate their political aims. For instance, in the 
sixteenth article, “Whoever abandons [the league] will be treated as if he had abandoned 
our Islamic faith and will be the object of our curses and scorn.” Thus, in the same way 
that the Sultan or the Sublime Porte claimed authority from Islam, the League of Prizren 
both legitimized and protected itself as an institution by invoking Islam.  These 
resolutions, which codified early Albanian national aspirations, demonstrate the self-
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conscious multi-vocal character of Albanian identity. The delegates at the league of 
Prizren consciously employed diverse sources of legitimacy, which attested to their 
multi-vocal identities, as Ottomans and Muslims. However, despite the fact that most 
delegates at the League of Prizren were Muslim, they were conscious of their religiously 
diverse population and, thus, also drew upon secular aspects of their identity, sources of 
legitimacy that were distinctly Albanian.  
This is particularly evident in the institution of besa, which is a particular type of 
oath based on a legal code formed the middle ages, Kanun-i Lekë Dukagjinit (The Code 
of Lekë Dukagjini) (See Appendix B.1). An Albanian prince called Leke Dukagjini is 
said to have possessed a codified version of the Kanun in the fifteenth century, but it had 
existed as an oral tradition for centuries, some even argue that its customs originate in the 
Bronze Age.110 Nonetheless pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic nature of the Kanun and besa 
helped ground the League of Prizren in an institution that was not associated with any 
religion, but rather to the most secular cultural tradition. This was one of the earliest 
examples of Albanians “modernizing” the institution of besa, by retrospectively 
reconstructing this time-honored tradition as a distinctly secular oath of political and 
social action. The Albanian political leadership at the League of Prizren understood the 
galvanizing capability of the besa and reconstructed its function to serve as a distinctly 
Albanian political institution.   
According to article 533 and 534 of the Kanun, the nature of besa, “has two 
forms: the oath upon a rock, according to the Kanun [or] the oath upon a cross or the 
Gospels…the oath upon a rock is one of the most solemn and terrible oaths known to the 
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Albanian of the mountains…”111Thus, even in the Kanun there is a difference between a 
religious besa and a secular besa, the latter “besa upon a rock” is initiated, “To exculpate 
oneself from an accusation, to bind oneself by oath against intriguers and traitors to the 
country, to stand ready to confront common threats and dangers.”112 The besa taken by 
the members of the League of Prizren was a besa upon the rock, it was an expression of 
unity in the face of a threat and thus one bound in ancient, secular tradition. Again, when 
the League of Prizren promised to fight for the Empire, their nation, and their fatherland, 
it was not merely rhetorical declaration. Their fatherland, the “rock” upon which they 
lived and swore sacred oaths meant something viscerally sentimental to them. As the first 
resolution claimed, the “territorial integrity” of Albanian land was the League’s foremost 
concern, by emphasizing territory, the potential internal disaccord in terms of religion or 
even class and culture were abrogated.   
In fact, the issue of class and culture was certainly a potential obstacle to unity 
within the League of Prizren, as the leadership of the group was not only religiously 
diverse but came from disparate class and cultural backgrounds. For instance, the 
Committee for the Defense of Albanian Rights was comprised of Albanian intellectuals 
and government officials like the Frashëri brothers educated at the Greek Zossimea 
gymnasium in Janina and Pashko Vasa who was fluent several languages.113 On the other 
hand, the chieftains and beys that comprised the majority of the League, not only 
occupied a minor social class, but also embodied a tribal cultural milieu largely 
unrecognizable to their elite counter-parts.   
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The alliance between these two social classes demonstrates the effective 
adaptability of the Albanian leadership and their recognition of the fluid, negotiable 
nature of Albania’s multi-vocal identity. The League of Prizren utilized this multi-
vocality to their benefit, in a similar way to the Ottomans, selectively referencing Islam, 
the institution of the Empire, their sacred territory, and secular cultural traditions. While 
the League of Prizren reiterated its loyalty to the Sultan and Islam, it is clear that even in 
these early stages Albanians found a practical advantage to constituting their political 
identity in ethno-linguistic, territorial terms. The League lobbied Benjamin Disraeli at the 
Congress of Berlin in the summer of 1878 to insist that Albanian-speaking territories be 
returned to the Empire, but they were largely ignored.  
Even after the Congress yielded most Albanian-speaking territories back to the 
empire, it was clear to the Albanian League that these concessions were merely 
maintaining the balance of power in Europe.114 The political aspirations of the League of 
Prizren had developed from merely keeping Albanian-speaking lands in the hands of the 
Empire to uniting these lands into a single Albanian vilayet.115 However, another result of 
the Congress of Berlin, and the fact that parts of Albanian land were still annexed to 
Montenegro, radicalized factions of the Albanian League. These frustrated members 
formed “Unionist Societies” with the primary objective of unifying all Albanian-speaking 
lands into one Ottoman vilayet with administrative autonomy. One such group was the 
Debra Unionist Society which issued a memorandum with five demands: the 
establishment of a unified Albanian province, the appointment of Ottoman civil servants 
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who spoke Albanian, the teaching of Albanian in all schools, the creation of an assembly 
for reforms, and money for public infrastructure.116  
The political aims of the Unionist Societies and the militant bands, especially in 
northern regions, remained consistently radical through the Hamidian era. These bands 
both defended Albanian villages from Slavic bands and attacked what they considered 
territorial encroachments in Albanian-speaking territories. However, beginning in 1878 
there was also significant intellectual and literary output developing concomitantly, 
which came to define the Albanian nationalist ideology. In tracing the literary output of 
these intellectual figures over time, the development of the Albanian nationalist ideology 
becomes apparent. As various contingencies, including external forces of war, diplomacy 
and trade, as well as internal policies that culminated in distinct events, affected average 
Albanians, these intellectuals put their reactions into words. This provides us with a 
unique look into the development of the worldviews of Albanians that not only had their 
fingers on the pulse of the political and ideological developments occurring among 
Albanians in Albania, but also had access to those developments occurring within the 
Ottoman bureaucratic structure and among Ottoman intellectuals in the Empire’s major 
cities.   
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Formulating National Ideology 
One of the most important bodies of sources for understanding how Albanians 
came to conceive of their national identity is the intellectual output of Albanian thinkers 
and political figures. By tracing the progression of Albanian national ideology through 
intellectual publications, one can understand the reactions and transformative meanings 
to which Albanians applied to the various contingencies that occurred in the period in 
question. While I acknowledge that focusing on intellectual sources is inadequate to 
determine the worldviews of the entire Albanian population, these sources remain 
fundamental. I argue that it was an intellectual transition, in interpreting the various 
contingencies and events that occurred from 1878 to 1913, which provided meaning to 
the social action of large segments of the Albanian population. While these figures were 
elites, they still articulated fundamental concerns of the Albanian population in the 
Ottoman Empire and were significantly involved in both the political organization and 
ideological direction of the most active Albanian political associations. 
I selected the following works and authors for a number of reasons. First, it 
should be acknowledged that there is a general lack of published sources from this era, 
particularly in the Albanian language, which is due to both Ottoman censorship and an 
overall lack of resources in Albania. Second, the reason that these works survive is due to 
each author’s status as a prominent figure in the Albanian national movement and, in 
most cases, the Ottoman politics as well. Furthermore, each of these figures embodies a 
multiplicity of Albanian identities that when understood together elucidate the complex 
manner in which Albanian national ideology developed in this period. For instance, 
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Pashko Vasa and Ismail Kemal held important political and administrative positions in 
the Ottoman Empire. Faïk Konitza held no political position and spent much of his life, 
from the age of eighteen, outside of the Empire in Europe and the United States. Sami 
Frashëri spent his life in Istanbul and, as a devote Muslim, offers a perspective that 
differs from Vasa, who was a Roman Catholic. These figures, together, exemplify the 
multi-vocal identities of Ottoman-Albanians at the turn of the twentieth century. Their 
diversity in religious convictions, various cultural, social and geographical origins, 
differing involvement with the Ottoman government and society, and disparate politics 
make these figures’ works fundamental. These men, with their complex, diverse identities 
and their distinctive, yet intimate perspectives provide a nuanced and multifaceted source 
for understanding Albanian nationalism as it developed from 1878 onward.  
 In addition to analyzing Pashko Vasa, Faïk Konitza, and Sami Frashëri’s work, I 
will also conduct a comparison between two works fundamental to Albanian and Turkish 
nationalism respectively, Frashëri’s Albania: What it was, What it is, and What it will 
Become? and Yusuf Akçura’s Three Kinds of Policy.117 In so doing, I will indicate the 
principal structural commonalities and points of divergence between Albanian and 
Turkish nationalism, in its early ideological conception. Furthermore, I will analyze one 
of Frashëri’s linguistic studies that, I argue, should be included among the earliest 
ideological contributions to Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire.  
By studying all of these works together and in a chronological and thematic 
progression, serves to elucidate the nuanced and complicated manner in which Albanian 
nationalism fits into the narrative of Ottoman history. Furthermore, these works 
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complicate extant narratives that neglect apparent contradictions in the intellectual output 
of Albanian nationalists to serve their interest in placing Albania as merely a latent case 
of prototypical Balkan nationalism. Some essential themes that emerge in these works 
include the opportunistic conjuration of Ottomanism, the diplomatic beseeching of 
European powers on behalf of “universal” enlightenment ideals, the rejection of religious 
differentiation in favor of a secular ethno-linguistic identity, and the cultivation of a 
distinctly Albanian identity, particularly in terms of language.  
Pashko Vasa 
Pashko Vasa, referred to in Ottoman circles as Vasa Pasha Effendi, was a poet, 
an Ottoman statesman, and one of the most important intellectual figures of the early 
Albanian national movement. Vasa was a Roman Catholic from Shkodër (İşkodra), a city 
in northern Albania, who held various administrative positions in the Ottoman Empire. 
Starting as the secretary of the British consulate in Shkodër, Vasa ended his illustrious 
career as the Governor of Lebanon, a position that he claimed from 1882 until his death 
in 1892. With knowledge of Turkish, Albanian, Italian, French, Greek, English, Serbian 
and Arabic, Vasa was one of the most impressive Albanian intellectuals of his day.118  In 
addition to his service to the Porte, he was a founding member of the Committee for the 
Defense of Albanian Rights in Istanbul, and a leading delegate at the League of Prizren.  
Pashko Vasa was one of the earliest proponents of a united semi-autonomous 
Albanian vilayet, as well as the use of Latin script for the Albanian alphabet.119 In fact, 
one of the earliest reactions to the Treaty of San Stefano came from Pashko Vasa in the 
form of a memorandum sent to A.H. Layard the British ambassador to the Ottoman 
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Empire, only fifteen days after the treaty was signed. This erudite letter, written in 
French, attempts to convey to the ambassador the historical, political and cultural reasons 
that the treaty “shows more than a lack of respect for the most elementary principles of 
justice and equality.”120 Vasa insisted that the Treaty of San Stefano has “no other 
significance or aim than to seek the destruction of Turkish rule in Europe.”121 
Furthermore, he was convinced that Russian malevolence “has cut European Turkey into 
two and seized the torso – including the heart and intestines…” and that “it is obvious 
that under such conditions a continuation of Ottoman rule in Europe is impossible…”122 
 In addition to evincing Russian machinations, Vasa claimed that the expansion of 
Bulgaria is demographically problematic, detrimental to a number of ethnic and religious 
groups, and threatening to the stability of the Balkans,  
It is still not rationally possible to accept that the Muslim, Albanian, Greek or Kutzovlach 
populations…should be considered Bulgarians and be encompassed within the new State which 
Russia proposes to create…The ethnic makeup, the language, customs, in fact, everything protests 
against Russian claims and the new doctrines of Panslavism.123  
 
Vasa not only appealed to the ambassador’s sense of justice, according to European 
standards of national self-determination, but also consistently points to the Russian 
Empire as manipulative, rapacious, power-hungry conspirators. Drawing upon his 
knowledge of the state of international affairs, Vasa appealed to the ambassador’s 
obvious desire maintaining the balance of power in Europe,  
Russia has declared that it went to war to improve the lot of the Christians and to put a swift end to 
all the problems which the Eastern Question was causing to Europe. If its aim was really as noble 
and unbiased as it claims, it should have considered…it was doing nothing other than planting the 
seeds for a more disastrous and horrifying was than the one we have just experienced…All of 
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Europe will find itself in a maelstrom of terrible consequences through Russian moves if the 
Powers do not intervene to modify the appalling conditions imposed upon Turkey by the 
Government of the Czar.124  
 
As Vasa signed the document “Wassa Effendi, an Albanian Catholic,” he 
augmented his legitimacy with the ambassador. In underscoring his identity as a Balkan 
Christian, he challenged Russia’s claim to protecting Christians in Ottoman domains as a 
disingenuous façade for fomenting acquisitive wars. This text is an intriguing example of 
the pragmatism and tact with which the leaders of the League of Prizren executed their 
goals. While it cannot be said whether this memorandum assisted in quashing the Treaty 
of San Stefano, it is incontrovertible that the British were the most strongly opposed to its 
passing, particularly because of their fears of Russian territorial avarice. The 
sophisticated way in which Pashko Vasa manipulated his multi-vocal identity as a Balkan 
Christian, an Ottoman politician, and European intellectual points to the strategic manner 
in which Albanian made use of their multi-vocal identities, particularly when playing the 
interests of European powers against one another.  
Indeed, one of the political benefits of having multiple identities was the multiple 
sources of legitimacy that Albanian nationalists could draw upon when making their case 
for autonomy. Thus, in Pashko Vasa’s poem Oh Albania, Poor Albania (O Moj Shqypni), 
written in Albanian and addressed to Albanians, his tone and meaning differ significantly 
from the above memorandum, written in the same year:   
Albanians, you are killing kinfolk, you're split in a hundred factions, some believe in God or 
Allah, say 'I'm Turk,' or 'I am Latin,' say 'I'm Greek,' or 'I am Slavic,' but you're brothers, hapless 
people! You've been duped by priests and hodjas to divide you, keep you wretched, when the 
stranger shares your hearth side, puts to shame your wife and sister, you still serve him, gaining 
little, you forget your forebears' pledges you are serfs to foreign landlords, who have not your 
blood or language…Wake, Albanian, from your slumber, let us, brothers, swear in common and 
not look to church or mosque, the Albanian's faith is Albanianism!125 
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The ideas this poem conveys are radical, both in its calls for the secular, ethno-
linguistic unification of Albanians and in its anti-foreign and anti-clerical undertones. 
Vasa indicted the Albanian religious establishment, both Christian and Muslim, for 
collaborating to keep Albanians divided using religion. While framed indirectly, there is 
also an anti-Ottoman implication in this sentiment. Indeed, the authority of these religious 
institutions was not only established and maintained by the Ottoman center, but was also 
an integral aspect of the governing Ottoman social system. This was true, in so far as the 
presence of religious institutions in Albania were, for the most part, associated with the 
Ottoman center, particularly the Muslim clerical establishment and the Orthodox 
Patriarchate. This issue later became one of the Albanian nationalist movement’s central 
deterrents, as Abdülhamid II used his powers over the clerical establishment to issue 
fatvas against Albanian nationalist causes, and had the Patriarchate ban the use of the 
Albanian language in liturgy.   
Furthermore Vasa refers to “foreign landlords” who have different “blood” and a 
different “language” and derides Albanians who accept this domination as “serfs.” While 
Vasa was likely referring to the encroachment of Slavic powers in Albanian territory, 
there is no doubt that he was making a subtle reference to the Ottomans as well. This 
points to Vasa’s interest, even in this early stage, in fomenting a more radical political 
urgency, in regards to the preservation of the Albanian nation. Additionally, Vasa 
advocated a positive ideological transformation among Albanians, which would extract 
them from the tutelage of the Ottoman clerical establishment and break down the social 
compartmentalization of Albanians based on confessional fidelity. Thus, when Vasa 
writes “feja e shqyptarit asht shqyptarija (the faith of the Albanian is in Albanianism)” he 
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urges Albanians reject religion as their source of identity and to adopt secular, pseudo-
Rousseauian, civil religion, based on ethno-linguistic, national identity.126 
This is an important innovation as none of the nuance or concern for the integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire, which existed in the Resolutions of the League of Prizren or 
Vasa’s Memorandum on the New Bulgaria, is present in this poem. Rather, the poem is a 
romantic appeal to the primordial ethnic ties that Vasa hopes to extract, if not construct, 
among Albanian-speaking peoples. Vasa was an Ottoman statesman, but he was also a 
combatant in the republican and nationalist Revolution in Italy from 1847 to 1849. In 
1850 even published, in Italian, an account of his experiences called La mia Prigionia, 
Episodio Storica dell’Assedio di Venezia.127 As an active participant in one of the 
nationalist revolutions that swept Europe in 1848, it is of no wonder that Vasa developed 
the romantic view of nationalism that he did. As an admirer of the Italian national 
movement, he encouraged an emotional patriotism and radical anti-clericalism to 
breakdown centuries-old divisions within the Albanian population. His personal desires 
for Albanian unity, expressed in this poem, manifested publically as he was the first and 
most active proponent, in the League of Prizren, for the unification of all Albanian-
speaking provinces into a single vilayet, which the League would later adopt as it’s an 
official objective.  
The memorandum and poem, when viewed together, particularly in light of the 
fact that they were written by the same man in the same year, demonstrates another way 
in which multi-vocal identity manifested in Albanian national ideology, as a sort of 
pragmatic tactical diversity. It points to the pragmatism with which the intellectual 
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figureheads of the Albanian national movement approached publicizing their political 
aspirations, whether to European powers or to the Albanian public. Vasa, demonstrated a 
remarkable tact in harnessing support from a variety of sources, and instructed other 
Albanian nationalists as to the importance of publicizing their cause with prudence and 
sensitivity as to the interests of their audience. While Vasa died before the emergence of 
a more active and organized Albanian national movement developed, his influence on the 
movement was immense, both in terms of its political strategies and in shaping its 
ideology.  
Faïk Konitza 
The same could be said for Faïk Konitza who, like Pashko Vasa, was an educated 
Albanian intellectual with ties to Europe. Konitza was educated at the Xavierian Shkodër 
Jesuit School, the famous Galatasaray Lisesi in Istanbul, the University of Dijon in 
France and Harvard University in the United States. His rich educational experience 
provided him with fluency in Turkish, Italian, French, German and English.128 Konitza, at 
the age of twenty-two, started a periodical key in propagating the Albanian national cause 
in Europe and the United States called Albania, which he published from Brussels, 
beginning in 1897, and subsequently in London and Boston in 1902 and 1909, 
respectively. 
 In 1899, Konitza published, from Brussels, The Memorandum on the Albanian 
National Movement in an effort to convince the Austro-Hungarian Empire to support 
Albania’s bid for territorial unity and autonomy.129 This document provided, for the 
authorities in Vienna, a detailed account of the condition of the Albanian national 
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movement. It is invaluable both as an intimate look into the inner workings of the 
movement, as well as an opportunity to understand the events that were most meaningful, 
according to an insider, at a crucial time in the formation of a cohesive Albanian national 
movement. This document serves as an intriguing, detailed, and contemporary account of 
the events from 1878 to 1899, from the perspective of an individual closely involved with 
the leadership of Albanian national movement. Konitza offers a perspective of an 
Albanian embedded in European and American intellectual circles, and as such 
foregrounds the cultivation of an Albanian literary culture as fundamental to the political 
legitimacy of an Albanian national movement. 
Konitza’s narrative begins with the decline of the League of Prizren and the 
appearance of an array of loosely connected societies that promoted the Albanian national 
cause politically and culturally. Konitza traced the development of the earliest of these 
institutions, with a particular interest in the publishing societies that produced Albanian-
language books and periodicals. Two of these societies were established in 1874. The 
first was the Drita (light) society, founded at the hands of a small group of Albanian 
elites in Istanbul, including Orthodox Christian Petro Poga, Sami Frashëri, and his 
brother Naim Frashëri. The first project undertaken at the hand of Drita was publishing a 
“reading book with an [Albanian] alphabet adopted by them.”130 In the same year, 
American-educated, Albanian businessman called Anastasios Koulourioti published the 
first Albanian-language newspaper in Athens. By 1882, the Greek government shut down 
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the newspaper, called The Voice of Albania, Koulourioti was subsequently arrested and 
died in an Athens prison the same year.131 In 1884 the Drita society in Istanbul received a 
firman from the Sultan to begin publishing an Albanian-language magazine called Drita, 
and after three issues renamed Dituria (knowledge). However, by 1885, after twelve 
issues “the Turkish government, seeing that the paper was widely read, took umbrage and 
began to make difficulties.”132 The conflict between the Drita society and the Ottoman 
state, Konitza claims, prompted the society to move their operations to Bucharest where 
they would continue to publish the magazine under the new leadership of Jani Vreto. 
Vreto was an Orthodox Christian and co-founder, with Sami Frashëri and Pashko Vasa, 
of the Central Committee for Defending Albanian Rights in Istanbul.  
However, the move to Bucharest according to Konitza, created a major division in 
the nascent Albanian national movement. This division he associated with conflicting 
loyalties, among Albanians, to various religious institutions. In Bucharest, the nature of 
the Drita society drastically changed when Nicolas Naço, an Albanian merchant from 
Egypt, donated a great deal of money to the society and took interest in its operations. 
The Drita society disintegrated into factions that reflected the divisions in the movement 
as a whole. Some Orthodox Albanians sought sponsorship from the Russian Empire, 
which had already demonstrated an interest in backing Balkan nationalists, while others 
sought sponsorship from the Kingdom of Greece. Some, like Konitza, thought Austria-
Hungary would serve as an effective sponsor of the movement, while the majority, whom 
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he refers to as “Turkish Albanians” desired to sustain Albanian’s place in the Ottoman 
Empire and encouraged cooperation with the Ottoman state.133  
Konitza saw the crisis within the Drita society, which he considered the heir to 
the League of Prizren, as one of essential mistrust among Albanians of different religions, 
cultivated by a social system that divided Ottoman subjects along confessional lines. 
Thus, he wrote of the factions, “if it were necessary to call oneself Albanian, no 
opportunity should be lost to work behind the scenes in favor of religion rather than the 
national movement.”134 The Drita society, as such, disbanded, as result of these divisions, 
and a number of factions, based primarily on religious divisions, were established in 
Bucharest. Konitza describes this, solemnly, as the dissolution of “an overall society, 
which was to bring together all the efforts, which was to work uninterruptedly, publishing 
and publicizing books and awakening the nation. But this effort collapsed as soon as it 
was born!”135  
The internal crisis that dissolved Drita is absolutely fundamental to understanding 
the complex origins of the Albanian national movement. The apprehension and insecurity 
that various groups of Albanians experienced during this time speaks directly to the 
manner in which Albanian multi-vocal identity manifested politically at this early stage.  
Konitza described the membership of Drita as “ignorant merchants who served in shops 
from the age of fifteen to twenty-five or thirty before opening shops of their own and 
making money…” Clergymen, government officials, intellectuals, military personnel, and 
other community leaders bombarded these average Albanians. They claimed Albanians’ 
decision as to how they dedicated their loyalty could determine not only their acute 
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personal interests, but also those of their households, their religious communities, and 
their countrymen. For Konitza, and many other Albanian nationalists, the disintegration 
of the Drita society was a troubling instance of the contradictions in Albanian identities 
engendering discord in the Albanian national movement. This real potential for internal 
conflict made clear, to Albanian intellectuals, the necessity to construct a secular, ethno-
linguistic, national ideology that distinguished itself from the various forces competing 
for influence in Albania.  
Indeed the factions from the Drita society began to establish their own political 
organizations. There was a “pro-Slav party” headed by the millionaire Hercule Duro and 
a “Greek party” under the leadership of Gavril Pema, both of whom agreed “that Albania 
must come under an Orthodox power…”136 This was not an uncommon feature of Balkan 
politics at the time, as various nationalist and irredentist groups sought the protection of 
the two foremost non-Ottoman regional powers, The Russian Empire and the Kingdom of 
Greece, supported and monitored by the European powers.137 However, in the Albanian 
case a third faction formed, more powerful than the others, a reconstituted Drita society 
established by Nicolas Naço.  The Drita distinctly favored relations with the Ottoman 
state compared to the other faction. Konitza recalled Nicolas Naço’s fidelity to the 
Empire, “on the Sultan’s birthday he went with two hundred Albanians to give a 
demonstration of loyalty in front of the Turkish Legation [in Bucharest].”138  
Naço devoted much of the Drita society’s efforts to establishing a propaganda 
network, in the hopes of garnering widespread support, among the Albanian population, 
for their program of autonomy and to combat the propaganda efforts of the factions 
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partial to Russia and Greece. In 1887, Naço founded another newspaper called Sqipetari 
(The Albanian) that served to buttress Drita’s propaganda effort, as well as to provide 
updates regarding their political activities and their effort to found Albanian schools.139 In 
the same year, Sami Frashëri, who was serving as an advisor in the Dîvân-ı Hümâyûn 
(Council of State), obtained a firman from the Sultan to establish an Albanian-language 
school in the southeastern city of Korça. This school was funded by the Drita society and 
had over 150 students, half of whom were Christian, the other half were Muslim.140 
Konitza remarks, however, that the Ottoman governor of Manastırdisseminated 
propaganda that deemed it “an infidel school” and encouraged the Greek bishop to 
threaten Christian parents that enrolled their children with excommunication.141  
Meanwhile, in 1890 the “pro-Slav” faction in Bucharest began to utilize the 
Cyrillic alphabet for the Albanian language as well as using Russian words to fill in for 
words that didn’t exist in Albanian, essentially “to turn the Albanian language into a 
semi-Slavic dialect.”142 Konitza is highly critical of these “pro-Slav” factions, referring to 
them as “uncouth,” “false patriots.” His frustration demonstrates the apparent difficulty 
of forming an Albanian answer to “the national question.” Konitza’s resentment of 
“degenerate Albanian townsfolk” and  “unpatriotic” Orthodox Albanians and his 
depiction of their stubborn refusal to form a cohesive national movement also serves to 
buttress his appeal to the Austro-Hungarian Empire for monetary and diplomatic support. 
Importantly, Konitza’s portrayal of a chaotic and impolitic movement elucidates his 
opinion that Albanians should seek the sponsorship and guidance of western European 
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powers. In his estimation, Austria-Hungary’s support would prove much less divisive 
than that of Russia or Greece, both of which had more at stake in the direction of the 
Albanian national movement. Konitza recalls the hindrance, at the hands of pro-Russian 
and pro-Greek factions, of his own efforts to establish a newspaper, called Albania. 
Tracing its development from its inception in 1896, Konitza notes,  
Some people thought the paper had received subventions from the Sultan to attack the Greeks. 
Others, that it was not an Albanian but a Young Turk paper, because there were attacks on the 
Sultan in it. These self-same jealous partisans of the Sultan reproached me several months later for 
talking of the Sultan in an unfriendly way.143 
 
Konitza demonstrates the precarious position of those advocating for a movement 
that was distinctly Albanian, as various forces competing for dominance in the Balkans 
had taken a keen interest in Albanian territories and the political allegiances of Albanians. 
Thus, even though Albania was seen as a tool of the Ottoman state, Midhat Frashëri, son 
of Abdul Frashëri, was arrested for distributing copies of the newspaper in 1897. He was 
held in prison by the Ottoman secret police until his uncle Sami Frashëri vied for his 
release. Konitza assessed that the situation of the Albanian national movement remained 
precarious in 1899, as the factions with ties to Russia and Greece dominated the Albanian 
political scene in Bucharest and the Istanbul faction was “in the care of several students.” 
However, momentum was building. A newly formed faction was active in Manastır. In 
Sofia, the Bashkimi (Unity) society printed an Albanian-language almanac and a Turkish-
language newspaper called Ittifak was distributed to the Muslim population, both 
Albanian and Bulgarian.144  
Furthermore, the movement was receiving significant support from Albanian 
diaspora communities abroad. In particular, the Arbëreshë (Albano-Italians) had 
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established communication networks in Italian consulates, established Albanian schools 
in southern Italy and Sicily, and made great strides in cultivating an Albanian literary 
tradition. Moreover, the Prime Minister of Italy Francesco Crispi, who was of Arbëreshë 
origin and participated in the Italian national unification movement, had arrogated 
support for the movement and made it Italian policy that no strong power would embed 
itself in Albania.145 The Arbëreshë in Italy established networks not only in Albania and 
Italy, but also in Egypt, Argentina, and Dalmatia. They published countless periodicals 
that served to rouse Italian public opinion in favor of the Albanian national movement. 
This included La Nazione Albanese, Nuova Albania, Corriere dei Balcani, Gazzetta 
Albanese and many others published in Calabria, Sicily, Rome, Naples and Milan.146 
Indeed, Konitza was apprehensive to embrace the assistance of the Arbëreshë movements 
in Italy, and undoubtedly included their activities in his memorandum to further 
encourage Austria-Hungary to take advantage of the opportunity to assist the movement, 
before another power had the opportunity to do so.  
 Konitza concluded his memorandum with a summation of the entire Albanian 
movement to 1899, he writes, 
There is in every Albanian head the germ of an idea, but this idea is neither old enough nor strong 
enough to get them into action. Why? … Collaborators, above all, are lacking. And the reason 
collaborators are lacking is the absence of schools. Where a school exists, there in effect is a 
nucleus for propaganda; and collaborators arise and take it on themselves to distribute 
publications…What is needed is to set up a college…with the double aim of quickly giving 
substantial training to future teachers of Albanian, and of attracting young people.147  
 
In this proposition Konitza has both provided Austria-Hungary with the opportunity for 
patronage in a new Albanian national movement, and potential state, while preserving the 
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structure and character of the movement as something genuinely Albanian. Indeed, while 
Austria could potentially fund the schools, it would be Albanians that learned and taught 
in them. Perhaps most importantly, it would be Konitza and those of his like that 
allocated the funds for these schools and formatted their programs of study. In this sense, 
Konitza called for a moderate patronage that would provide the means of gradually 
inculcating the Albanian youth with a national sentiment that promoted ethno-linguistic 
unity. Furthermore, like Pashko Vasa, Konitza made a very convincing case for Austro-
Hungary’s interest in Albania’s future, as he has told of the substantial influence of 
Russian and Greek sympathizers and the involvement of other diplomatic missions in the 
affairs of burgeoning Albanian political factions.  
 Besides demonstrating, again, the pragmatic diplomatic maneuvering of the 
Albanian leadership, particularly in terms of manipulating foreign diplomatic rivalries, 
Konitza’s memoir points to the factious nature of the Albanian national movement in 
1899. In spite of its biases and potential exaggerations, this document demonstrates the 
manner in which Albanians continued to grapple with the political manifestations of their 
multi-vocal identities. The disparate character of the Albanian national movement is 
largely unaccounted for in historical narratives, but it attests to the unique development of 
Albanian nationalism, particularly when considering that the largest of these factions 
attested loyalty to the Ottoman Empire.  
Albanians were agents in a highly complex domestic and international situation. 
Their multi-vocal identities prompted multitudinous loyalties, as Balkan irredentists and 
foreign powers vied for influence in southeast Europe and threatened their status as 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The specific issues that emerge in the Albanian crisis of 
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identity, particularly in terms of religious affiliation and political loyalty, are key to 
understanding the manner in which certain Albanian figures rapidly changed their ideas 
concerning the place of Albanians on the international political scene. In 1899, according 
to Konitza’s memorandum, the Albanian national movement was in motion but largely 
directionless, and it was clear that ideologically, Albanian nationalists would have to 
actively promote a conception of Albanian identity that traversed the divisions prompted 
primarily by religion. Sami Frashëri would take up this task and assemble some of the 
most radical ideological means of engendering unity among Albanians for the national 
movement. In so doing, Sami would attempt to distantiate an Albanian national 
consciousness from divisive political and religious institutions, including the Ottoman 
Empire.  
Sami Frashëri and Yusuf Akçura 
Şemseddin Sami, as he was known in the Ottoman Empire, was an Ottoman 
political figure and one of the most respected intellectuals of his day. As Sami Frashëri, 
however, he was key political leader and intellectual figurehead of the Albanian national 
movement. In fact, Sami was a pioneer intellectual, not only in defining Albanian identity 
in ethno-linguistic terms, but also, as I will demonstrate later, in defining Turkish identity 
in those same terms. As an intellectual, Sami embodies the internal Albanian crisis of 
identity, as both an Ottoman and an Albanian. However, he came to resolve this crisis by 
contributing, concomitantly, foundational theoretical material for both Albanian and 
Turkish national ideologies. While Sami provided one of the most radical declarations of 
Albanian irredentism and indictments of the Ottoman state, he also contributed to 
foundational ethno-linguistic theories from which Turkish nationalist ideology would 
spawn. As one of the fathers of both Albanian and Turkish nationalism, Sami Frashëri 
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personifies Albanian multi-vocal identities, their contradictions and the manner in which 
they were resolved in nationalism.  
In the earliest stages of the Albanian national movement, Sami made attempts 
to reconcile Ottomanism with burgeoning nationalist sentiments among Albanian, and 
indeed in the Empire at large. In December 1878 he published an article in the newspaper 
Tercüman-ı Hakikat, with this reconciliation in mind.148 Sami formulated a theory that 
asserted the coexistence of two vatans (motherlands) for Ottoman subjects.  In his 
formulation the Ottoman Empire was the “general vatan” of all Ottoman subjects, who in 
turn also possessed a “special vatan,” which reflected an individuals territorial, religious, 
and ethno-linguistic origin.149 In an attempt to revise Ottomanist ideology, Sami 
accommodated burgeoning nationalist sentiments in the Empire by acknowledging, under 
the auspices of Ottomanism, room for identities other than religion. In so doing, he both 
encouraged loyalty to the Sultan and advocated for leniency from the Ottoman center 
when it came to the aspirations of groups, like Albanians, to cultivate their own cultural 
traditions. Sami depicted the interplay of diverse Ottoman identities as a natural 
symbiosis that reflected what he considered an updated understanding of Ottomanism. 
However, as the Albanian national movement began to percolate in the Balkans and 
Istanbul, Sami began to more vigorously defend Albanian aspirations of political 
autonomy under the Empire. 
In 1879, Sami co-founded the Istanbul-based Society for the Printing of 
Albanian Writings, which promoted an Albanian literary culture by formatting an 
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Albanian alphabet and publishing Albanian literature.150 However, in 1885, Abdülhamid 
II, banned printing in the Albanian language. For the Hamidian regime, Albanian 
publications both undermined their Pan-Islamist agenda, which designated Ottoman-
Turkish as the language for all Muslims, and had the potential to propagate irredentism 
among his Albanian subjects. In fact, Abdülhamid II received fetvas from the şehülislam, 
deeming the use of Albanian as both blasphemous and treasonous to the Caliphate. 
Furthermore, Abdülhamid II allied with the Patriarchate to ban the use of Albanian in 
Orthodox liturgy.151  
Throughout this period, 1889 to 1898, Sami composed his vast six-volume 
encyclopedia, the first encyclopedia written in Turkish, called Kamus ül-A’lam. In it, he 
devoted entries for Arnavutluk (Albania), Arnavutlar (Albanians) and Besa, finding a 
place in the Ottoman encyclopedia for distinctly Albanian subjects. Sami provided a 
detailed account of the Albanian past, focusing on ancient ethnic connections to the 
Pelasgians and Illyrians, as well as figures like Skanderbeg (listed as İskender Bey), the 
heroic figure that fought against invading Ottomans.152 Moreover, in 1899 and 1900, 
Sami published a groundbreaking two-volume Ottoman dictionary called the Kâmûs-i 
Türkî.153 In both of these works, and many other publications, Sami began to furtively 
propagate his developing nationalist ideology in an attempt to prove a primordial 
distinction between Turks and Albanians, linguistically, culturally, and historically. 
Taking advantage of his status as a prominent Ottoman intellectual, Sami surreptitiously 
                                                
150 Ibid., 53-59. 
151 Ibid., 90. 
152 Sami Frashëri, Kamus-Ül Alâm: Tarih Ve Cografya Lûgati Ve Tabir-I Esahhiyle Kâffe-Yi 
Esma-Yi Hassa-Yi Camidir (Istanbul: Mihran Matbaasi, 1889).  
153 ———, Kâmûs-I Türkî, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Çagri Yayinlari, 1978). 
  Licursi 72  
 
made a case for Albanian nationalism in the Ottoman public sphere, in an effort to sway 
his peers to embrace ethno-linguistic categories of differentiation.  
One of the most intriguing examples of this is from an 1898 article that Sami 
wrote for the famous Istanbul journal Servet-i Fünün (The Wealth of Knowledge), 
entitled Lisân ve Edebiyatımız (Our Language and Literature) (See Appendix C.1). A 
number of elements of this article are intriguing. Particularly, the pride with which Sami 
advocated for cultivating Turkish literature and the manner in which his arguments reflect 
the cornerstones of later Turkish nationalism, propagated by figures like Ziya Gökalp. 
Additionally, the fact that Sami continually used the first person plural, when referring to 
the Turkish nation and the Turkish language, indicates the fluid multi-vocality of his 
identity. This is particularly striking when compared to his radical, anti-Ottoman, 
nationalist manifesto published only a few months later: Albania: What it was, what it is, 
and what will become of it? 
The essential motivation of Lisân ve Edebiyatımız was to resurrect the Central 
Asian origins of a Turkic linguistic and literary tradition, which, according to Sami, had 
been largely eradicated by various influences on the Ottoman language, during conquests 
into Europe and the Middle East.  
Bu vechile Türkçe beş altı asır edebiyattan mahrum ve yalnız tekellümde müstamel kaba bir lisân 
halinde kaldıktan sonra Türklerin münteşir bulundukları memalik-i vâsianın iki ucunda hemen 
birden parlamağa başladı. Bir taraftan Maveraünnehir’deki Türkler söyledikleri Çağataycayı ve 
diğer taraftan Anadolu ve Rumeli’ndeki Osmanlılar o vakit söyledikleri Türkçeyi yazmağa 
başlamışlardı.”154  
 
In this way, the Turkish language, for five or six centuries forbidden from literature and employed 
only in speaking and remaining, thus, in a crude linguistic state, started to shine all of a sudden 
from the two extremities of the wide and scattered domains of the Turks. On the one side the 
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Turks of Transoxania started to write the Çağatay they spoke and on the other the Ottomans in 
Anatolia and Rumelia started to write the Turkish they spoke at the time.155 
 
Sami shows his prowess as a linguist and intellectual as he introduced one of the 
first ethno-linguistic theories of pan-Turkic unity in the Ottoman context. Sami was 
clearly well informed as his understanding reflects the theories of his contemporary, 
Hungarian Orientalist Armin Vambrey. Vambrey conducted his own research in the 
1850’s that traced the Turkic origins of various peoples in Europe and asserted a similar 
understanding of ethno-linguistic Turkic unity. Sami’s interest in resurrecting the 
relationship between Central Asian Turkic languages and Ottoman-Turkish was one that 
became incredibly popular among Turkish nationalist intellectuals in the twentieth 
century. Sami was not only interested in disinterring the Central-Asian roots of the 
Turkish language, but also he insisted that Ottoman-Turkish was mongrelized by Arabic 
and Persian influences. He advocated for a return to the Ottoman language’s 
fundamentally Turkic roots.  
Lisân-ı Osmani üç lisândan yani Arabî ve Fârisi ve Türkçe lisânlarından mürekkebdir demek âdet 
olmuştur…Ne kadar yanlış, ne büyük hata! Üç lisândan mürekkep bir lisân! Dünyada görülmemiş 
şey! Hayır! Hiç de öyle değildir. Her lisân bir lisândır.156  
 
It is customary to say that the Ottoman language comes from the inks of three languages Arabic, 
Persian and Turkish…What is so wrong, what a great mistake! From the ink of three languages, 
one language! Something unprecedented in the world! No! It is not at all like this. Each language 
is a language.  
 
Sami refers to the interjected Arabic and Persian words as “soğuk ve külfetli” 
(cold and burdensome) as well as “münasebetsiz” (awkward), and thus detrimental to the 
Ottoman literary tradition. In rejecting the Ottoman-Turkish language’s non-Turkic 
sources, Sami implicitly encourages a consolidation of Turkish identity, along ethno-
linguistic lines. This was in direct opposition of the Pan-Islamist ideology of Abdülhamid 
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II, who asserted the linguistic dominance of Ottoman language, with its Persian and 
Arabic influences, as the language of the Caliphate and, thus, Ottoman Muslims. Sami’s 
theory that Arabic and Persian served to mongrelize the Ottoman-Turkish language had a 
lasting impact on Turkish nationalism. It was a key consideration in the 1928 Language 
Commission, which both changed the Turkish alphabet from Perso-Arabic to a modified 
Latin alphabet, in addition to substituting Persian and Arabic words with Turkic ones.157  
The implicit promotion of consolidating, cultivating, and reforming language, 
with the undertones of a remote glorious linguistic past is a typical nationalist 
reconstruction of history, in which both Turks and Albanians took part. Sami participated 
in this type of historical reconstruction in the Albanian national context as well. For 
Albanians he claimed a direct ethno-linguistic continuity with the ancient Pelasgians and 
Illyrians, which served to ground Albanian culture in a glorious past. In the Turkish case, 
Sami participated in laying the initial intellectual groundwork for a similar Turkish 
national ideology that would start with Yusuf Akçura and culminate in Ziya Gökalp’s 
pan-Turkism. Drawing on similar ethno-linguistic theories Gökalp’s The Principles of 
Turkism (Türkçülüğün Esasları) advocated for the active inculcation of “Turkishness” 
into the culture of the Ottoman Empire that would establish a new national identity 
espoused in the Republic. Part of this identity was to reconstruct an ethno-linguistic 
historical connection to Central Asia, in order generate a cultural affinity between Turks 
and other Turkic peoples northeast of Anatolia, from a glorious nomadic past.158  
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Indeed, it seems that while Sami Frashëri was working on constructing a new 
Albanian national political and cultural tradition, both as a founder of the Committee for 
Defending Albanian Rights and the Society for the Printing of Albanian Writings, he was 
also actively promoting the cultivation of Turkish ethno-linguistic cultural identity. It is 
this seemingly contradictory phenomenon that attests to Sami’s multi-vocal identity, 
which reflects the multi-vocal character of Albanian identity, generally. Sami was a 
proud Ottoman and was sentimental regarding the Turkish language as such,159  
Millimiz olan Türkçe, dünyanın en güzel lisânı değil ise hâla en güzel lisânlarından biri olduğunda 
şüphe yoktur…160 
 
Our nation’s Turkish language, if not the world's most beautiful tongue, there is no doubt, is still 
one of the most beautiful of the world’s tongues… 
 
Clearly, regardless of his Albanian identity, Sami felt a personal affinity with the 
Turkish language and considered it a fundamental component of his identity. However, 
only a few months after he wrote these sentiments, in 1899, Sami would publish a 
fervently anti-Ottoman nationalist manifesto with the intent of both promoting 
irredentism and degrading Turks as forsaken tyrants. His Albanian-language publication 
Albania: What it was, what it is, and what will become of it?, makes it quite clear that 
Sami viewed Albanians and Turks as mutually exclusive components of a fledgling 
empire that had to form separate political entities to ensure their survival.  
What is particularly striking about this work, is its severe indictment of the 
Ottoman state as incompetent and tyrannical, while speaking admiringly of other Balkan 
nationalist movements. This was quite unlike any of Sami’s previously published works, 
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which strove to reconcile the contradictions of Ottoman-Albanian identity through 
synthesis. In the first sentence of the section entitled “Can Albania Survive as it is?” Sami 
writes, “Albania is a part of European Turkey. Its existence today is linked to the survival 
of European Turkey. Will Turkey survive much longer in Europe? Either it is not 
possible to give an answer to this question or the answer is no.”161 While, Sami framed 
his manifesto as a pragmatic response to a distinct question about the Empire’s survival 
in Europe, his rhetoric regarding the Ottomans drastically changed. He abandoned any 
argument for cooperation between Albanians and the Ottoman Empire. In a radical call to 
reason he urged Albanians to abandon the Ottoman Empire’s “yoke” and to prepare for 
its independent national survival.162 The abrupt and distinct ideological change apparent 
in Sami’s work is striking, considering that it was published just a few months after the 
proto-Turkish nationalist piece discussed above. Yet, in this short span Sami came to 
espouse irredentism and view the Ottoman Empire with great disdain,  
The other nations of European Turkey have started making preparations for its downfall so that 
they will be able to survive on their own and not fall prey to the collapsing remains of Turkey. 
These nations are like the grass which feeds and grows under the snows of winter and, when the 
frigid, heavy mantle melts from the face of the earth, begins immediately to thrive and take on a 
fresh green color. But the Albanians, who have been under Turkey's rule for so many centuries, 
even though they see that the huge monster is decrepit and is more and more bedridden by the day, 
will not give up relying upon it. The snows of so many centuries under which other nations have 
fed, have deadened Albania's roots. Albania has frozen over and withered during this long winter 
of somber tyranny, even though it has not been oppressed as much as the other countries have.163 
 
 Sami encouraged Albanians to look to other Balkan irredentist movements for 
inspiration, and to internalize their dire situation as one of national survival. Instead of 
blaming Slavic territorial voracity or European interventionism for Albania’s precarious 
international situation, as was typical of earlier nationalist sentiments, Sami censures the 
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Ottomans for “doing nothing to prolong its survival…Like a sick man who will not listen 
to his physicians and is torturing his body…”164 Still, this great ideological 
transmogrification is driven by a sort of pragmatism, despite the emotional rhetoric in 
which it is couched. For instance Sami speaks of the other Balkan movements as “making 
preparations” for their survival during the collapse of the Empire, as though the impetus 
for nationalism is a pragmatic desire for territorial integrity in the face of the 
disintegrating Ottoman Empire.   
In fact, despite his harsh anti-Ottoman language, Sami recognized the long 
standing friendship between Albanians and Turks, “…the Albanians long were comrades 
of the Turks and not their slaves, but now they are suffering under great oppression and 
are being beaten and trampled underfoot more than the rest. Do they not see that they are 
leaning against a wall which is collapsing and which will crush and bury them?”165 Once 
again, he framed his denunciation of the Empire as a pragmatic response to a set of broad 
global and domestic circumstances, and the failure of the Ottoman state to provide for the 
Albanians as subjects. Sami recognized the strong bond between Albanians and Turks, 
but, for him, the Ottoman’s failure to protect Albanian nationhood, forced them to 
organize for their own national interest. Sami was undoubtedly an Ottoman; he was a 
devout Muslim, a resident of Istanbul, an advisor to the Porte, and a fundamental scholar 
of the Empire and its language. It is clear that, for Sami, rejecting the Empire was a last 
resort, but a necessary step in preparing Albanians for what he saw as the inevitable 
disintegration of Ottoman Europe, particularly in light of Abdülhamid’s attacks on 
Albanian cultural and political movements.  
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However there is a subtext in Sami’s literary output, when considered as a whole 
that makes this ideological shift consistent with Sami’s multi-vocal identity. Perhaps 
rather than trying to identify a specific contingency that prompted Sami’s ideological 
shift, one can consider the fact that Sami, as both an Albanian and an Ottoman, desired 
what was best for both Albania and the Ottoman Empire. His convictions, in regards to 
ethno-linguistic nationalism and the cultivation of a distinct, national literary identity, 
prompted him to propose a break between Albanians and Turks, for their own good. He 
advocated for that break subtly at first, through cultural criticism and scholarly work, but 
eventually came to promote this break in more radical political terms. Perhaps, Sami 
envisioned the inevitable disintegration of the Ottoman Empire as multi-ethnic, multi-
religious, expansive, and inclusive. Thus, Sami participated in both movements, aware of 
the unavoidable contradictions, truly believing that the Ottoman Empire would inevitably 
unmix into distinct ethno-linguistic nations. His desire was to ensure, in the best way he 
could conceive, Albania’s territorial and cultural survival in the fallout of this process.  
Historians are engaged in a debate about whether Albanians had a primordial, 
longstanding enmity with the Ottoman Empire, or whether Albanians could be considered 
a loyal, undifferentiated part of its fabric. These questions, in a sense, detach rational 
agency from Albanian actors, as though they are simply acting out a predetermined 
historical trajectory. In fact, Albanian nationalists were very actively manipulating their 
history for their own survival. In reality, Albanians like Sami Frashëri reacted to the 
multiplicity of contingencies they were faced with throughout this period and the 
meanings they associated with these contingencies changed over time, as did their 
emotions and ideas. Thus, throughout the movement, rhetoric that praised the Sultan and 
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affirmed the loyalty of Albanians to the Ottoman state existed along side rhetoric like 
Sami’s that expressed deep hostility for Turks and the Ottoman state:  
The Albanian is like a man who has fallen into the sea and knows how to swim, but who not only 
wants to save himself, but who also wants to save another man who has fallen into the sea and 
does not know how to swim. The wretched fellow, the Turk, will not let the swimmer rise to the 
surface and clamber out of the water, but instead grasps him by the two legs or by a leg and an arm 
and drags him down, not letting him swim. Thus not only does the Turk drown, but the Albanian 
drowns, too, and is lost at sea. Why do the Albanians, who see this peril, let themselves be clung 
to by this sick and demented fellow who cannot save himself and will not let the other one survive, 
but who rather endeavors treacherously to drown him, even though the Albanian is struggling to 
keep afloat? What ought a person to do in such a perilous situation? Well, he must give the traitor 
who is trying to drown him a good kick and expedite him to the depths of the sea, thus saving 
himself. This is the road to salvation. There is no other.166  
 
Of course, Sami did not have a pathological hatred for Turks as, in a sense, he 
considered himself a Turk, rather he used this rhetoric to promulgate an ideology that he 
was convinced could politically unite Albanians to save Albanian territory from the very 
real threat of invasion and foreign domination. Even in this particularly severe passage, 
the first line indicates Sami’s self-reflexive recognition of the deep affinity between 
Albanians and Turks, acknowledging that most Albanians wanted to save the Ottoman 
Empire. However, for Sami, this ideal, which was incontrovertibly one that he had long 
held, was a practical impossibility. Albanians, Sami claimed, must completely abandon 
the Ottomanism and the Empire to ensure their national survival, 
Although we must show respect for the dead, we must also bury them in the ground. If we cannot 
bring ourselves to say farewell to them, we have no choice but to jump into the grave with 
them…the revival of Turkey means death for Albania…Up to now, Albania has managed to 
maintain its national identity and its language, but it will not be able to do so anymore if there are 
no schools and learning in the country. Yet the government of Turkey will not let the Albanians 
open schools and promote their language, as it does for the others, its enemies and those of 
Albania, whom it allows to do as they wish. Thus, if Turkey should live on for another few years, 
Albania will not survive. It will be forever divided up between the Greeks and the Slavs.167  
 
Again, while Sami presents a profound indictment of the Empire, it is by no 
means motivated by an irrational hatred for the Ottoman “yoke.” In fact, it is perceptibly 
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pragmatic. The Ottoman Empire was repressing the proliferation of Albanian cultural and 
political life and simultaneously failing to defend its European territories. This situation 
left Albanians socially, culturally, and politically defenseless to the expansionist 
ambitions of their neighbors. Adding to Sami’s adroit comprehension of the international 
political order, he advocated for a political rather than a violent subversive movement,  
The Albanians have no need to take to arms, to take up positions on mountain tops and in caves, to 
kill and ravage as other nations have done to gain their freedom. The Albanians are not as trodden 
upon and broken that they need to involve themselves in such ventures. They need do nothing but 
unite, swear a common oath to one another in manly fashion, keep their oath steadfastly, and 
demand their rights from Turkey and of Europe. Turkey will listen and will cede to their demands, 
willingly or unwillingly. Europe will help as it has helped other nations, and will compel Turkey 
to grant them their rights.168 
 
 Once again, Sami’s approach to enacting his ideology is practical, as he had 
observed the successes and failures of other nationalist movements in the Balkans. Thus, 
he promoted a political movement that would appeal to European sensibilities for 
national rights, and encouraged Albanians, to whom this piece was addressed, to 
conceive of themselves as a cohesive political entity. This is especially significant when 
those national rights include complete political autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, the 
exclusive use of the Albanian language in schools, and the disintegration of the 
Patriarchate’s power structure in Albania. However, as from the very beginning, Sami’s 
essential demand is for the cultivation of Albanian “culture” and “national identity,” 
“…there can be no Albania without Albanians; there can be no Albanians without the 
Albanian language; and there can be no Albanian language without a writing system for it 
and schools in which to teach it.”169  However, Sami is not satisfied with reform, perhaps 
the most radical statement in the text is that which proposes a new government,  
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But in order for this to happen, the present government must be done away with and a patriotic 
government must be installed, a government which will act in accordance with the needs and the 
rights of the Albanians - a vigilant Albanian government and not a blind foreign government as we 
have today. What we need is proper government, whatever it may be called.170   
 
 This statement of proposed independence lays the groundwork for two key 
trajectories in the Albanian national movement. The first trajectory was more 
traditionally irredentist, seeking independence and the establishment of an Albanian 
national state. On the other hand, there were Albanians that viewed their national 
aspirations as consistent with, even symbiotic with subversive Turkish factions that 
desired a new constitutional Ottoman state. While Sami called for Albanian 
independence, his emphasis on the institution of a “proper government” was a 
cornerstone of Albanian national ideology, in which political action and reform had the 
potential to strengthen the international position of the Albanian nation.  
Sami’s seemingly dramatic ideological oscillation between Ottomanism and 
uncompromising Albanianism, does not indicate a merely personal conversion, but rather 
is indicative of a broader structural shift in ideology both in irredentist nationalisms 
typical of the Balkans and an increasingly centralized, even myopic concept of 
Ottomanism, which was co-opted by Abdülhamid II and repackaged as Pan-Islamism. 
Sami’s work can be seen as not only a reaction to the plethora of contingencies that he 
and other Albanians were faced with at the turn of the twentieth century, but also a 
reaction to broader ideological forces and structural changes in the international political 
environment and within the Empire. Indeed, Abdülhamid’s suppression of Albanian 
political and cultural organizations was a result of his Pan-Islamist policies, which were 
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reactions to these very political and ideological forces.171 Sami foresaw no place for 
Albanian national identity in this new vision of Ottomanism and promoted a complete 
break with it.  
Indeed, this is not far from the dissatisfaction of many Ottoman intellectuals with 
Abdülhamid’s new homogenizing vision of Ottomanism. Indeed, Sami’s seemingly 
contradictory views embodied a phenomenon found among Ottoman-Arabs as well. 
Khalidi writes that for Arabs “…there were several way stations between Ottomanism 
and Arabism…” meaning that “Arabists could also be believers in the Ottomanist 
ideal...”172 The same could be said for much of the Albanian leadership, whose multi-
vocal identities contributed to complex worldviews that informed seemingly 
contradictory views and competing loyalties. This certainly separated Albanians and 
Arabs from most other ethnic groups in the Empire, particularly in the Balkans, where 
nationalists seemed to experience a less profound crisis of reconciling their nationalist 
politics with their loyalty to the Ottoman state.  
Turkish figures reacted to these contingencies with a similarly deep fear as to the 
survival of the Empire and formed similarly nationalistic ideological responses, in terms 
of promoting massive political reform and galvanizing a national identity. For instance, it 
was not only Albanians whose publications were censored by the regime of Abdülhamid 
II. Turkish proponents of reform were also severely limited by Hamidian censors, and as 
David Kushner points out, this censorship actually provided an intellectual platform for 
the formation of Turkish Nationalism. Under Abdülhamid II articles discussing the 
regime and any internal politics were censored or banned completely, thus one of the 
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only permitted outlets for journalists to veil their critiques or promote their ideologies 
was in articles about culture and history. Thus, Turkish nationalists found outlets in 
periodicals like Sabah, of which Sami was a frequent contributor, in which the 
groundwork for Turkish nationalism was laid in articles about everything from linguistics 
to ethnographic histories.173  In fact, Sami’s article Lisân ve Edebiyatımız, discussed 
above, was an archetypical example of this phenomenon, in which an intellectual could 
express his desires for drastic reforms in Ottoman society by discussing remote academic 
subjects like linguistics.  
One of the main phenomena that both Turks and Albanians reacted to was the 
promulgation of irredentist Pan-Slavism, which had splintered the Empire’s European 
domains into aggressive independent states, backed by foreign powers. Surely the need to 
centralize the Empire under a more scrupulous central government was a pragmatic 
imitation of the European model of the nation-state. Yet one crucial aspect of that model 
was an ethno-linguistic national identity. Indeed there was a need in the Ottoman Empire 
to create a cultural and linguistic framework to breakdown the barriers of the millet 
system and to reverse the divisions prompted by the tanzimât reforms. Nevertheless, this 
type of integration came with a price. Part of the cost of national centralization was the 
alienation of many of the remaining non-Turkish ethnic groups in the Empire, 
manifesting in intensified nationalist sentiments.  Just as Sami Frashëri viewed irredentist 
movements in the Balkans with a concomitant consternation and admiration, Turkish 
nationalist reacted to these movements in the same way. As the overarching ideological 
structures of Ottomanism were transformed and acute threats to the existence of the 
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Ottoman state became more imminent, the remaining groups in the Empire reacted by 
prompting an ethno-linguistic consolidation of their identities.  
There is no other document that encapsulates this process and the trajectory of the 
early Turkish nationalism more completely than Yusuf Akçura’s Three Kinds of Policy 
(Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset), published in 1904. In this groundbreaking work, Akçura advocates 
for a positive program that would overhaul the prevailing Ottoman ideology, rejecting 
both Tanzimât Ottomanism and Hamidian Pan-Islamism in favor of a nuanced Turkism, a 
“Turkish political nation based on race…a Turkish nationality that constituted a scientific 
rather than a political entity.”174 In his treatise Akçura systematically critiques the three 
possible trajectories, which could have defined the Ottoman worldview: Ottomanism, 
Pan-Islam, and Turkism. For Akçura, Ottomanism has failed in its attempted 
amalgamation of different “societies” under a single political entity:  
This means that every society finds its own interest in survival, that is in acquiring and increasing 
its power. Hence, as among all living species struggling for survival, we witness a ceaseless 
conflict among societies. We are obliged to accept this condition. The interest of each society is in 
its existence, consequently in being powerful…in the majority of cases the interests of one 
community are secured at the expense of another, for what conceivable reason can we justify the 
infliction of harm on another section of mankind? The question can be answered by our natural 
inclinations, or, to put it differently our emotions, which our minds have not managed to explain 
or justify. I am an Ottoman and Muslim Turk. Therefore I wish to serve the interests of the 
Ottoman State, of Islam, and of the Turks.175 
 
The similarities to Sami Frashëri’s 1899 manifesto are striking. The first and most 
important is the ideology that both Sami and Akçura share in terms of the existence of as 
international order of ethno-linguistic nations that are in conflict with one another and 
must fight for their very survival. This proto-Darwinian understanding of the global 
political order is key to their respective rejections of Ottomanism as an outdated, inept 
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ideology at the turn of the twentieth century. Both thinkers define the nation as an ethno-
linguistic category based on historic primordial races.  
Yet there is distinct pragmatism in approaching national ideology in ethno-
linguistic terms that, if not opportunistic, was at least a practical reflection of the 
international political and ideological scene for the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 
twentieth century. In this sense, Akçura and Sami advocated for a more exclusive notion 
of national identity, than ever conceived in Ottomanism, because for them it was the only 
foreseeable option in the face of structural ideological trends and the acute threat of 
nationalist movements on their borders. That is, both to keep up with Europe and the 
ever-encroaching nationalisms on Ottoman borderlands, both Albanians and Turks 
needed to adopt similar nationalist strategies for their survival as nations, even if that 
meant abandoning Ottomanism and the Empire, as such.  
Nevertheless, the intimate affinity that both Sami and Akçura had with 
Ottomanism emerged even when they presented rational arguments for its abandonment. 
Both thinkers recognized their multi-vocal identities as Ottomans. Sami, even when he 
scathingly indicted the Ottoman state, did not deny the inherent, long-standing, 
synergistic affinity that Albanians shared with the Empire. On the other hand, Akçura 
was forthright in acknowledging his multiple identities as “an Ottoman, Muslim and 
Turk.” Indeed the issue of reconciling religious identity, ethno-linguistic identity and 
allegiance to the Ottoman Empire are central to both the Albanian and Turkish national 
ideologies.  
While these more structural ideological commonalities are strikingly similar, 
Akçura and Sami differed in two important ways. The first is Akçura’s correct 
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recognition of the primordial ties between Turks and the Ottoman dynasty, a connection 
that Sami could not have claimed for Albanians, in spite of their service to the Ottoman 
state. Akçura recognizes three components of his identity; he labels himself an “Ottoman 
and a Muslim Turk.” He indicates that each of these components of his identity are 
“natural inclinations.” Thus, Sami advocates for an autonomous Albanian political entity, 
while for Akçura, Turks can simply co-opt the Ottoman state for their new Turkist aims. 
The second, and most important, is the place of Islam. Akçura notes that “because all the 
Turks who would be united are Muslims and essentially on important points they have 
things in common, it gives the impression that it is supporting the policies of Islamism 
and Turkism at one and the same time.”176 For Akçura, there is no reason that Turkists 
have to reject Islam because Turks are almost entirely Muslim. In fact, according to 
Akçura, Islamism can functional pragmatically, as Turkism could co-opt Islam to attract 
constituents to the ideology. This demographic uniformity did not exist in the Albanian 
context, in which Orthodox Christians and Catholic made up a prominent minority. For 
Sami, religion only served to divide Albanians, thus he promoted a strictly secular notion 
of nationalism,  
Albanian men! Join your two hands in a besa, a league and in unity. This is what will save you. 
Otherwise you will be lost. Do not turn to religions and beliefs. Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox 
- they are all Albanians wherever they are, and they are all brothers. They must all unite under the 
sacred flag of Albania. Any Albanian who abandons his brothers and leaves them to join the foes 
of Albania, breaking his besa, is a traitor. He is an enemy of our people and our homeland. Better 
that such a man not exist. He must be regarded as a foe and not as an Albanian.177 
 
Sami, while a devout Muslim, rejected religious distinction in favor of an ethno-
linguistic, territorial notion of nationalism. Thus, Sami, like the League of Prizren 
appropriated and “modernized” the very traditional, secular institution of besa as the 
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cornerstone institution buttressing the Albanian national movement. Sami selects a 
particular part of Albanian culture that traversed socio-political divisions and emphasized 
commonality in Albanian identity, not unlike Akçura’s advocating the use of 
commonality in Islam to promote Turkism. In this way, while Albanian and Turkish 
nationalist ideologies were reactions to the same structural forces and contingencies, 
these differences determined their eventual mutual exclusivity.   
 However, one cannot substantiate the claim that these structural commonalities 
between Turkish and Albanian nationalism based solely on an analysis of literary 
sources. Indeed, these commonalities manifested materially in the social and political 
actions of Turkish and Albanian actors, particularly during the Young Turk Revolution of 
1908. I will demonstrate how the 1908 Revolution, and particularly the events at 
Ferizovik, embodies a culmination of synergy between the Albanian and Turkish 
nationalism, in which lofty ideological aspirations manifested into material actions that 
disarticulated structural networks, and nullified complex identities in a euphoric moment 
of collective effervescence.178  I will also explore the forces that made this moment so 
short-lived, and the manner in which it devolved into political consolidations of Albanian 
and Turkish identities, mutually exclusive and antagonistic to one another.  
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The Revolution, Ideology and Social Action 
 Many Albanians participated in the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, both as 
members of militant bands that carried out the revolution in the Balkans, as well as in the 
upper echelons of its political and intellectual leadership. For instance, Ibrahim Temo, 
known to Albanians as Ibrahim Starova, was a founder of the revolutionary political 
organization the Committe of Union and Progress (Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti), 
founded in 1899.179 Temo was also a member of the Society for the Printing of Albanian 
Writings, as well as a founder and vice-president of the Albanian nationalist Bashkimi 
(Union) society.180 Another Albanian figure key to both the Albanian national movement 
and the Young Turk Revolution was Ismail Kemal. Ismail Kemal Bey, as he was known 
in Ottoman circles, is one of the most intriguing figures in late Ottoman history, for the 
way in which he negotiated his active political role in both Albanian and Ottoman 
political movements and for the detailed memoir, written in English, that depicted this 
period in Ottoman history with a remarkable insight.  
Ismail Kemal was born in Vlorë, on the southeast Albanian littoral. Many of the 
Vloras were beys and pashas connected to the Empire, while others were involved in a 
series of anti-Ottoman insurrections. For instance Ismail Kemal’s grandfather was 
beheaded for leading a revolt in 1820 and his entire family was sent into exile, to 
Salonika, because his father and uncles had organized a revolt against tanzimât taxation 
and conscription reforms. Nevertheless, Ismail Kemal was raised like many other 
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Ottoman Muslim elites. He learned Turkish in primary school and attended the Greek 
Zossimea gymnasium in Janina, as their first Muslim pupil.181 Ismail Kemal moved to 
Istanbul after his secondary education and quickly embarked upon a career in the 
Ottoman civil service. At the age of twenty-two he was appointed by, then Governor of 
the Danube, Midhat Pasha to assist him in governing his sancaks. 
 Quickly becoming one of Midhat Pasha’s closest confidants Ismail Kemal 
assisted him in his efforts to propagate liberalism and constitutionalism in the Empire. 
Ismail Kemal was indispensible in gaining international support for Midhat Pasha’s 
reform efforts, traveling to England and France in 1865 to learn about local democracy, 
administration and public finance. When Midhat Pasha and the liberal faction dethroned 
Abülaziz in 1876, Ismail Kemal and his peers attempted to initiate a new constitutional, 
liberal Ottoman state.182 However the malleable Murad Vs alleged mental illness lead to 
the succession of his brother Abdülhamid II only ninety-three days later. Abdülhamid II 
had appointed Midhat Pasha Grand Vizier, but he was soon after exiled along with Ismail 
Kemal in February 1877.183 Ismail Kemal attributed the failure of liberalism in the 
Empire to the European powers’ reticence when it came to publicly and effectively 
supporting Midhat Pasha and his liberal faction, he wrote,  
The Liberals of Western Europe seem to me like heirs to great fortunes, who think only of 
enjoying the wealth acquired by the efforts and the sacrifices of their ancestors. In these countries 
Liberalism is only the label of a party of a means of attain power… [Midhat Pasha] possessed the 
supreme courage of making known his Liberalism at the moment when any others, having arrived 
at the height of their ambitions and power, would rather for their own preservation have shown a 
certain reserve.184 
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After two decades of service interspersed with exile, Ismail Kemal finally fled the Empire 
in 1900 to work full-time for both the Albanian national cause and Ottoman 
constitutionalism. In 1901 Abdülhamid II had requested that Ismail Kemal take a new 
post, Kemal wrote, “I, of course declined this curious offer, replying that His Majesty 
knew perfectly well why I had refused further service in the Empire, and that for the 
same reasons I could not accept the proffered task and continue to live on Turkish money 
as recompense for purely imaginative services…”185 Abdülhamid II subsequently tried 
him for high treason, ordered his execution, and revoked his ranks and property. 
The role of Ismail Kemal as a figure in Ottoman and Albanian history is 
fundamental. As an Ottoman civil servant, a European intellectual, a liberal reformist, 
and an Albanian nationalist, Ismail Kemal personifies the webs of overlapping political 
loyalties that were shared by Albanians and Ottoman Turks. His experience is key to 
understanding the events of the first decade of the twentieth century in the Ottoman 
Empire, particularly the coalescence of Albanian and Turkish political wills to bring 
down the regime of Abdülhamid II and institute constitutional reform. Additionally, 
Ismail Kemal’s final ideological break with the Ottoman state, dominated at the time by 
the CUP, coincides with that of the Albanian national movement’s final rejection of the 
Empire. Thus, Ismail Kemal’s memoir is a crucial source, the first hand account one of 
the most politically active Ottoman-Albanians of this period.  
The Ottoman revolutionary period was set in motion with the 1902 Congress of 
Ottoman Opposition Parties in Paris. In preparation for the congress, one of its leaders 
Prince Sabaheddin and his brother Prince Lutfullah personally recruited high-ranking 
Ottomans with liberal sympathies, including Ismail Kemal. In a private meeting at Ismail 
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Kemal’s residence in Brussels, Prince Lutfullah requested his presence at the conference. 
Ismail Kemal expressed his interest in the congress but outlined two conditions for his 
attendance,  
Namely, that all the ethnical elements in Turkey should be represented, so that the desiderata of all 
the people of the Empire might be formulated. It was essential, in my opinion, to show that those 
who were against Abdülhamid were acting simply and solely with a view to creating a national 
Government that should be equally impartial and beneficent to all the peoples of the Empire. My 
second condition was that the Powers signatory of the Treaties of Paris and Berlin should know 
that in the eyes of the Ottoman people they had pledged their honor concerning the adoption of 
reforms for the good of the Empire. If the aid of Europe were invoked, the congress might be of 
some value, but if it stopped at the mere expression of opinions and nothing more was done, I 
could see no use in it. 186 
 
 Lutfullah accepted both of Ismail Kemal’s conditions, and the conference was 
held on February 4th in Prince Sabaheddin’s personal residence in Paris. Ismail Kemal 
was pleased that forty delegates “representing all the races of the Turkish Empire” 
attended the meeting.187  However, his latter condition proved to engender a significant 
rift in the congress, creating two strongly opposed ideological factions.  A major debate 
precipitated between the “Turkist” and “anti-interventionist” faction, later the CUP, lead 
by Ahmed Rıza and Ibrahim Temo and the Armenian revolutionaries, the 
Dashnaktsutiun.188 The debate centered on Ahmed Rıza’s proposed, “organization of a 
central and centralizing power at Constantinople in the interests of the purely Turkish 
element.”189 On the other hand, the Dashnaktsutiun proposed, “the organization of local 
government independent of the central administration, and based solely upon foreign 
protection in accordance with Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin.”190  
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While neither a strong central government, based on Ahmet Rıza’s proposal, nor 
the Armenian appeal for autonomy garnered support from the “majority” of the assembly, 
a more serious conflict arose from this debate. This conflict centered on accepting 
European intervention to help remove Abdülhamid II. Prince Sabaheddin, Ismail Kemal 
and the “majority” of the conference advocated for “an appeal to the Powers for a regime 
consonant with the principles of the constitution to embrace all the ethnical elements of 
Turkey, guaranteeing them justice and liberty and the maintenance of their national 
rights.”191 On the contrary, Ahmed Rıza and Ibrahim Temo strongly opposed any form of 
invited European involvement.192 Ahmed Rıza gave a speech to the assembly,  
I categorically refuse intervention by the foreigners, under any title whatever, in the domestic 
affairs of our fatherland. Because: Every nation is free to conduct its domestic affairs in 
conformance to its own will. This right is recognized all around the world and by all nations. Even 
the Serbians and Bulgarians are rejecting foreign intervention…Each time foreign powers have 
intervened in our domestic affairs they have been contemplating their own interests…to demand 
European intervention means to present a mandate to Europe and to confess our inability and 
impotence…Patriotism and national dignity charge us to act in this way.193  
Disagreement regarding the issue of European intervention caused a permanent rift in the 
Ottoman opposition movement that persisted in Ottoman politics, even after the 1908 
Revolution.194 This split is absolutely fundamental to understanding the subsequent, 
irreconcilable political conflicts that would occur within the Ottoman opposition, 
particularly between Albanians and CUP. Ahmed Rıza and the CUP, though they 
represented a minority in the 1902 Congress, would eventually gain dominance not only 
in implementing the revolution, but also in arrogating absolute power in the post-
revolutionary government. As Ismail Kemal notes,  
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The minority, consisting of those who later led the revolutionary movement in Turkey opposed 
this resolution and had a counter-resolution inserted in the final procés-verbal. This profession of 
faith of the Young Turks it seems to me, was the basis of the programme carried out later on by 
the Committee of Union and Progress…The lack of agreement among Turkish reformers which 
had become manifest during the Paris Congress prevented any possibility of united political action 
likely to give reason to hope for a change in Turkish affairs.195 
 
Ismail Kemal identified what he considered a problematic break in the Ottoman 
opposition movement that was, as far as he was concerned, the result of the CUP’s 
aversion to the specified allocation of rights to minority groups. For Ismail Kemal, 
Ahmet Rıza’s antipathy for European intervention and desire for a centralized state was a 
projection of his interest in promoting purely “Turkish interests” in the new Empire.196 It 
is important to note, that even the CUP was not in complete agreement. For instance, 
Temo and Rıza had major disagreements in regards to individual national rights, the 
status of ethnic and religious minorities, the implementation of a Latin alphabet, and most 
importantly the presence of the Turkish language in schools throughout the empire.197 
While the CUP would become the incontrovertibly dominant opposition group in the 
Empire, for brief period after the 1902 Congress, Prince Sabaheddin and Ismail Kemal 
felt had acquired some agency to implement the “majority” plan to call upon Europe for 
assistance. Thus, Ismail Kemal orchestrated an “action that would have the effect of 
giving alarm and attracting the attention of Europe, by which means the Sultan would be 
forced to come to terms.”198 Indeed, in 1902 Ismail Kemal obtained both a statement of 
informal support from the British Embassy and the word of the Marshal of the Ottoman 
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army in Tripoli, Redjeb Pasha, that he would take the city of Salonika. However, due to a 
series of logistical blunders the plan was never enacted.  
With this failure, Ismail Kemal, Prince Sabaheddin and his faction gradually lost 
significance as membership in the CUP swelled. In reality, the “majority” was not at all 
united, many of the ethnic groups that supported Prince Sabaheddin, like the 
Dashnaktsutiun, returned to their homelands and advocated for their independent national 
projects. In fact, according to historian Şükrü Hanioğlu, “the only significant support 
came from Albanian organizations, but their support was of slight value in attracting the 
Great Powers, since the endorsement was by Muslim Albanians.”199 Thus, Sabaheddin 
continued his work eventually founding the League of Private Initiative and 
Decentralization that espoused liberalism, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in 
the Empire, particularly the Armenians, and appealed to Europe for support. However, as 
Hanioğlu notes, his intellectualism and involvement in high politics paled to “his 
opponents’ simple patriotism and eschewal of the high politics that many members of the 
Ottoman intelligentsia, and more important the officer corps, typically regarded with 
disgust, made him the perennial loser in Ottoman politics from 1902 to 1922.”200 
The ascendancy of the CUP truly manifested in the, follow up, 1907 Congress of 
Ottoman Opposition Parties, also in Paris, in which the CUP had the congress espouse a 
singular objective: the removal of Abdülhamid II. In order to accomplish this, a massive 
tactical alliance was established between all of the opposition groups, prompting euphoric 
feelings of solidarity, particularly among the nationalist minority groups. Many Albanian 
nationalists were radicalized by the Congress’ appeal to activism and began to organize 
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militant bands under the auspices of well-organized, local CUP chapters. However, this 
great tactical alliance was merely symbolic for the CUP, as they consolidated complete 
power over the direction of the revolution.201  
Some Albanian intellectuals, like Ismail Kemal, saw a crisis in a massive alliance 
dominated by the CUP under the pretext of unity. He writes, “By union the Albanians 
understood a grouping of different races under the flag of the Ottoman Constitution, 
which would strengthen the Empire by the union of its peoples, guaranteeing to each its 
national existence. The Committee [of Union and Progress], on the other hand, only 
thought of uniting all the different races by forcing them to deny their origin…”202 
Others, like Faïk Konitza, saw violence as premature in his periodical Albania, expressed 
disdain for those Albanian bands fighting Ottoman and Greek forces in Macedonia as 
early as 1907. He deemed these group and their supporters as belonging to the “school of 
assassination and massacre.”203 Much like those more conservative Young Turks who 
opposed the activist wing of the CUP, Konitza saw the need for Albania to be put on “the 
road to civilization” before it could engage in a full on revolution for autonomy.204  Both 
Ismail Kemal and Faïk Konitza were hostile to the CUP, and the leadership of the CUP 
reciprocated this hostility, seeing both men as collaborators with outside powers, with 
national aims that threatened the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.205  
Nonetheless, there were many nationalist Albanian members of the CUP, as well 
as a great deal of collaboration between independent nationalist Albanian groups and the 
CUP. In 1905, the CUP had established an important base in Manastır and quickly 
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founded branches all over Albania. Branches were formed in Resna, Ohrid, Strugë, 
Shkodër, Üsküb, Ferizovic (Ferizovik), Mitrovicë, and Prizren.206 In many cases official 
members of the CUP were also members of local Albanian nationalist committees, and in 
the cities of Gjirokastër and Dibër the CUP and Albanian nationalist committees 
thoroughly combined into one organization.207 Additionally, many Albanian Bektashis 
were encouraged to join the CUP, which was partial to the sect due to its distinctly 
“Turkic” character and its antagonistic relationship with Abdülhamid II.208  
In December 1907, continued unrest in Macedonia prompted the European 
powers to become more concerned about “Macedonian Question,” concerning the 
Ottoman administration of Macedonia, restored to the Empire at the Congress of Berlin. 
The so-called Salisbury-Ignatiev program, which was a joint agreement between British 
and Russian diplomats, laid out extensive reforms to put an end to the “Eastern 
Question,” for good.209  The CUP utilized this renewed foreign interest in Macedonia in a 
massive propaganda campaign that told of imminent European intervention in Macedonia 
to both destroy its Muslim population and the Ottoman Empire in Europe. The CUP 
encouraged imminent revolution in Macedonia and violence against any government 
officials “known for theft and corruption.”210 
Albanian involvement in this effort was indispensible to the CUP’s efforts in 
Macedonia. As Hanioğlu notes, “The CUP was well aware of the fact that without the 
support of certain segment of the Albanian population, which made up a considerable 
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portion of the Muslim populace in the European provinces, success was impossible.”211 
The CUP undertook an extensive propaganda campaign in Albania. They sent out 
Albanian officers who promised that the revolution would bring Albanians freedom from 
heavy tax burdens and protect them from Austro-Hungarian territorial advances. They 
appealed to Albanian Muslims with staunch anti-interventionism and were careful not to 
speak ill of the Sultan, dear to Muslim Albanians, and instead referred to his advisors as 
the progenitors of the Empire’s problems.212 The CUP’s promises of freedom under the 
constitution convinced large numbers of Albanians to mobilize for the revolution. In 
Resen, the Albanian mayor and other notables joined the CUP’s Resen National Battalion 
an armed group whose numbers reached over 1,000. By May 1908, the entire region of 
Chamëria, the southern most Albanian littoral, became a stronghold at the hands of 
Albanian CUP officers.213  
The CUP co-opted almost the entire network of Albanian nationalist committees, 
which organized militant bands and joined the CUP en masse. They sent Adjutant-Major 
Ahmed Niyazi to negotiate with representatives from the Albanian nationalist bands and 
convince them to join the CUP, in the name of Ottomanism and the constitution.  He was 
successful and a sizeable coalition was formed, comprised of various Albanian notables 
and the Albanian nationalist bands, under the leadership of the CUP forces of Ohrid, 
Resen and Manastır. This coalition comprised mostly of Albanians, attacked the city of 
Resen on July 3rd, striking the first military blow of the revolution.214 This encouraged 
widespread revolt of all the armed groups under the direction of the CUP, throughout the 
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Balkans. Indeed, Albanian participation in the revolution was so significant in the actual 
execution of the revolution that Ahmed Niyazi said, “most of the leaders and partisans of 
[the movement for] constitutional administration were [Albanian] not Turkish.”215 In 
Hanioğlu’s assessment this is accurate, “When one considers the officers and privates in 
the CUP’s so called national battalions, the local notables who supported the movement 
and fed those battalions…this comment appears accurate… Thus it was understandable 
that the Albanian considered the revolution an Albanian enterprise, and they expected 
special treatment.”216 
Ferizovik 
While the Turkish leadership of the CUP had orchestrated the revolution from 
above, for all intents and purposes it was Albanians that executed it on the ground. The 
integral role that Albanians played in the 1908 Revolution, as well as their sincere hope 
vested in constitutionalism, for preserving their culture and nationhood was embodied in 
a distinct event in the town of Ferizovik. On July 5th 1908, 3,000 Albanians gathered at 
the town of Ferizovik in Kosovo. They did so in response to a rumor, spread among 
residents, that Austria-Hungary was planning an invasion of Kosovo from their stations 
in Bosnia.217 Word of the gathering spread throughout Kosovo and thousands marched on 
Ferizovik, burning railways on their way to halt the alleged invasion.218 The Grand 
Vizier, troubled by the news of further unrest in the Balkans, immediately dispatched 
Colonel Mirliva Galib Bey to disperse the spontaneous gathering. However, unbeknownst 
to the Grand Vizier, Galib Bey was a member of the executive committee of the CUP’s 
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Skopje (Üsküb) Branch. When Galib Bey arrived he called upon members of the 
Bashkimi and the Drita societies in Bucharest to assist him in directing the crowd to 
support the revolution.  
At this point numbering over 20,000, the Albanian crowd, which included 
hundreds of armed tchetas (guerillas) from the north, occupied the local post office and 
sent hundreds of telegrams to other Albanian cities inviting them to join their 
gathering.219 At the behest of Albanian nationalist leaders in alliance with Galib Bey, the 
thousands gathered swore a besa and an oath on the Holy Quran, pledging their 
commitment to restoring the constitution and reinstituting the parliament. 194 Albanians, 
including mufti, ulema, şeyhs, local notables, leaders of both CUP and Albanian national 
committees and tribal chiefs, signed a codified version of the besa.  
On July 20th, the besa, was copied into two telegrams sent to the Grand Vizier and 
the şeyhülislam, demanding the restoration of the constitution. The possibility of a 
massive insurrection in Kosovo sent grave fear into the Abdülhamid’s administration. 
The Sultan received the telegram on July 21st, the next morning he sent the following 
telegram to Ismail Kemal, in Paris:  
If time had allowed I would have sent my confidential man, Ilias Bey, to Ismail Kemal Bey to 
confer with him as to what had best be done at this critical juncture. Go to him immediately and 
beg him to give you his written opinion, which you will forward to me by telegraph.220  
 
  Ismail Kemal noted that the events at Ferizovik “had produced a greater 
impression on [the Sultan] than the remonstrance of all the Turks or all the diplomatic 
representations of Europe.”221 In his reply, Ismail Kemal, “advised His Majesty without a 
moment’s delay to promulgate the Constitution, that being the only efficacious remedy 
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and the only sure way of grouping around his throne all the peoples of the Empire.”222 On 
July 24th 1908 Abdülhamid II restored the 1876 constitution and with it initiated a new 
era in Ottoman history.223 As if regenerating the spirit of the League of Prizren, these 
Albanians, who had gathered in tens of thousands, traversed religious, political, and class 
barriers in the name of a cause that they considered an embodiment of their various 
political desires, the implementation of the constitution. These Albanians had invested all 
of their political aspirations in the constitution, because for them it represented an appeal 
to a universal justice. All the desires for security, for the right to preserve and advance 
their culture, for their right to live independently of foreign occupation were embodied in 
this moment. In this sense they invested their entire identity in the constitution, invoking 
besa, the Islamic concept of shura or consultation, in addition to their duty to protect the 
vatan and padişah.  
This mass collectivity, which had originally come together to oppose the rumored 
invasion of the Austro-Hungarian army in fear for their personal safety, had transformed 
into constitutionalist revolutionaries.  The meaning of their collective social action had 
changed completely, from a specific concern to a universal interest. The contingency of 
this massive gathering had transformed the individual demonstrators into a politicized, 
collective body motivated by new, greater meanings – constitutionalism, patriotism, and 
parliamentarianism. This was a moment of collective effervescence, a transcendent 
collective energy that drove individuals to behave in a remarkable fashion, augmenting 
their interpretations, collapsing and elevating their multifarious webs of identities, 
meanings and motivations into a single one, the constitution. Indeed, the transcendent 
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nature of this gathering was not lost on the observing Ottoman officials. They were 
flabbergasted when members of the crowd, whom they had assumed were ignorant 
commoners, were reading copies of Driutia.224  
Thus, I claim that the events at Ferizovik embody what William Sewell calls the 
“historical event,” the ultimate coalescence of contingency and structure. According to 
Sewell a historical event, “is a ramified sequence of occurrences that is recognized as 
notable by contemporaries, and that results in a durable transformation of structures.”225  
The gathering at Ferizovik was an event originally motivated by the contingent threat of a 
rumored invasion. However, it had transformed into an event that was motivated to 
disarticulate the Empire’s existing structural networks, to completely transform the 
Empire. Austria-Hungary’s alleged invasion was the original source of meaning for the 
Albanians’ social action of gathering and demonstrating at Ferizovik. However, by July 
20th the motivation of the 20,000 demonstrators’ social action had transformed into 
reinstating the constitution and the freedoms they assumed it would espouse. According 
to Ismail Kemal, it was the gathering at Ferizovik, more than the coordinated military 
efforts of the CUP, which prompted Abdülhamid to reinstitute the constitution, which 
permanently transformed the social and political structures of the Empire.  
The exemplary historical event, for Sewell, is the taking of the Bastille during the 
French Revolution on July 14th, 1789. Ferizovik, I argue, is the Bastille of the 1908 
Revolution. The Gathering at Ferizovik, like the Storming of the Bastille, embodied a 
major schematic transformation, a distinct shift in the semiotic meanings, interpretations 
and motivations of political culture. Indeed it was the gathering itself that had 
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transformed Albanians’ political consciousness. They both empowered, through their 
social action, theses structural schemas, like constitutionalism, patriotism, and 
parliamentarianism, and in turn, their social actions were further empowered by these 
structural schemas. This was a dialectic of contingency and structure that, like the 
storming of the Bastille, resulted in what can be called nothing else but a massive 
“dislocation of structure.”226 
The nature of the Ottoman society and politics was astoundingly transformed by 
the 1908 Revolution. Ottoman high politics were permanently replaced with the political 
workings of the CUP, bringing mid-level military officers into the highest positions of 
political power. This deep societal transformation signified the end of Ottomanism, as the 
CUP embraced a policy of political and social centralization, the latter of which has been 
called “Turkification.”  However, before the CUP arrogated power, the granting of the 
Ottoman constitution on July 24th, was met with an incredible euphoria that swept the 
Empire. A fascinating first hand account, published in an alumni magazine for the 
University of Toronto, recounts of the euphoric reaction to the news of the reinstituted 
constitution. Particularly, this account highlights the manner in which the constitution 
served to dismantle divisions embedded in Ottoman society, with a particular focus on 
the unity of various ethnic and religious groups.  
We were approaching Ismid, Another boat, similar to ours but hailing from Ismid, came 
to athwart our bow. They called to us, but their hoarse cries were unintelligible. As they drew 
quickly near, we saw a man stand up and wave something to us. We turned and rowed to him. The 
calls were intelligible now: ‘Long live the Sultan!’ ‘Padishahum chok yasha!’ ‘Canoni Issassi!’ 
‘Hurriet!’ ‘The Constitution! Liberty!’ The excitement grew intense. The sizzling heat was 
forgotten. We found ourselves shouting, yelling at the tops of our voices. The boat could hardly 
contain us. These two boats at last touched. The suspense was unendurable. The men in the other 
boat seemed to have gone wild. They could hardly tell us the news. Broken sentences we caught: 
‘The Constitution is granted.’ ‘We are free-free-free!’ ‘Down with the khafies, the spies, down 
with Izzet and the other tyrannous pashas.’ ‘Long live the Sultan!’ Enthusiasm knew no bounds. 
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We cheered and yelled until we could yell no more. Perspiration streamed from us. One of our 
crew went into a hysterical fit, another was weeping aloud. A man handed me a paper, the 
Puzantion, a Constantinople Armenian daily. In enormous headlines – the first I had seen in a 
Turkish paper—appeared the words: ‘Liberty! Fraternity! Equality! Justice!”…All subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire, Mohammedan, Christian, Jew, to whatsoever religion or nationality they 
adhered, all were to be called Osmanlis. They were all equal before the law. 
We had to rub our eyes to believe that we saw what we were reading. Loud, boisterous 
enthusiasm yielded every now and then to dumb, blank astonishment…from the direction of the 
market place, off in the distance, came a dull roar. We ran, as many of us had never run before. 
We found others running in the same direction, old men and young men, women, children, Jew 
and Gentile, Christian and Moslem, hurrying jostling each other in mad Endeavour. Yet there was 
a complete absence of all violence…. A Turkish soldier stopped to help along an old woman. It 
was plain to see that she was an Armenian, a Christian, a Giaour! Wonder of Wonders! Was the 
world coming to an end? Venerable Turks fell on the shoulders of Armenians, of Greeks. A Greek 
beside me was hugging an Armenian. A Turk saw me. He took me in his arms and pressing 
convulsively kissed me on my forehead…Speeches were made—by an Armenian, a Greek, a Jew, 
a Turkish Mollah--- all repetitions of the one great truth. Cheers rent the air. Strangers clasped 
strangers, kissed them and wept over them. A new sentiment was born to Turkey. Hope, hope for 
oneself, for the future, and the enthusiasm that came with it could not be tamed.227  
 
The euphoria that pervaded the Empire surrounding July 24th was palpable, a 
seemingly ubiquitous emotional eruption had occurred simultaneously with a socio-
political awakening. For Ottoman subjects, regardless of their religion, ethnic identity, or 
class, the constitution had redeemed them, everything had changed, and they celebrated 
the ushering in of a totally new reality. As in Ferizovik, crowds throughout the empire 
experienced collective effervescence. Motivated by “a common passion,” they 
transcended their personal and socio-structural limitations, embracing new political, 
social, and cultural meanings.228 They espoused constitutionalism, liberty and equality; 
they sought out their neighbors of different creeds and ethnicities and enacted public 
displays of solidarity. Indeed, as Chambers said, there was a new pervasive “sentiment” 
in the Ottoman Empire.  
In the Balkans, while militant bands rejoiced in the streets and publically handed 
their arms to the CUP, scores of political exiles returned to the Balkans, including Ismail 
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Kemal and Ibrahim Temo. For the first time, a legally operating Albanian press appeared 
in Albanian-speaking territories, newspapers like Korça, Lidhja Orthodhokse (Orthodox 
Union), Tomorri, Bashkimi i Kombit (Union of the Nation), and Bashkimi were published 
in cities across Albania. Around a dozen other Albanian language publications were 
published in Istanbul, Salonika and Cairo.229 By 1909, sixty-six Albanian national clubs 
were formed to advance the cultural and political position of Albanians in the Empire. 
These clubs had over 10,000 members in twenty cities, including Manastır, Salonika, 
Janina, Korçë, Elbasan, Gjirokastër, Berat, Vlorë, Filat, Starovë, Üsküb and Istanbul.230  
There was a palpable feeling among Albanians that the constitution was a crucial 
first step in their movement; that it guaranteed their right to progress their community 
under the auspices of a new Ottoman system. For instance in August 1908, just a few 
weeks after the reinstatement of the constitution, a group of Albanian CUP members in 
the city of Vlorë, founded The National League for the Promotion of Albanian Schools. 
They dedicated themselves to two programs, “…the consolidation of the Ottoman 
national state of the Young Turks and on the separatist and autonomous tendencies of the 
Albanian patriots and the League.”231 Indeed, in just ten months, fifty-nine Albanian-
language schools were founded, with 3,748 pupils.232 For Albanian members of the CUP, 
liberty and equality meant the right to autonomous political organization and cultural 
independence. They shared the euphoria of their Ottoman compatriots in regards to the 
constitution, but for the Albanians, there was a lot of work to be done. Those that had 
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fought valiantly in the revolution had assumed that the new constitutional regime would 
support their political and cultural endeavors, this optimism however, was short-lived.  
In Macedonia, which was described in the weeks following the revolution as “a 
utopia,” Enver Pasha made a speech to the gathered bands and shouted, “Henceforth, 
there are no Bulgarians, Greeks, Roumans, Jews or Mussulmans; under the same blue sky 
we are all equal, we glory in being Ottomans.”233 Those that Enver Pasha addressed, the 
thousands of Albanian nationalist bands, leftist Macedonian militants, Kurtzo-Vlach 
bands,234 and others that fought in the revolution, had missed the ominous implication of 
his statement. Enver Pasha and the CUP did not consider Ottoman identity an 
amalgamated patchwork of religious, ethnic, and cultural identities. Rather, Ottoman 
identity, which for the CUP meant Ottoman-Turkish identity, subsumed any of the 
identities of those who participated in the revolution.  
Indeed, the CUP had consciously manipulated many non-Turkish groups into 
participating in the revolution. They pledged to uphold Ottomanism and insisted that the 
constitution would ensure their freedom. Thus, Albanians, who had spilt more blood for 
the 1908 Revolution than any other group in the Empire, had done so under the false 
pretense, propagated by the CUP, that the freedom guaranteed by the constitution would 
include the cultural and political freedom of nations. When the revolution succeeded, it is 
of no wonder that Albanians were anxious to commence in cultivating Albanian cultural 
and political life, and it is also of no wonder that they were bitterly disappointed when the 
CUP thwarted those efforts. The CUP felt that they earned the right to determine the 
direction of the new Ottoman society. Thus, it was the CUP that arrogated the power to 
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determine the meaning of the revolution and the meaning of a new Ottomanism. For the 
CUP, equality meant homogeneity, fraternity was a brotherhood of young ambitious 
officers, and liberty was freedom from the old regime and European encroachment, 
which could only be ensured by a strong, powerful CUP program. Ottomanism, for the 
CUP, meant a modern, rational, centralized state with one language and one nation.  
The CUP and the End of Faith in Ottomanism  
The CUP used Ottomanism as a general pretext to implement pragmatic policies 
of power consolidation and centralization, but the character of their brand of Ottomanism 
was distinct in its emphasis on Turkification and centralization. In the aftermath of the 
revolution, Albanian nationalists who were convinced had earned a special place in the 
new constitutional Empire, for all of their work in the revolution, came into direct and 
fierce conflict with the CUP agenda. Indeed, the CUP’s “Turkification” policies, which 
emphasized cultural and linguistic homogeneity clashed directly with the aspirations of 
Albanian political leaders to cultivate their language and culture under a new free 
constitutional state.  
It was at this point, after the revolution, when the formerly collaborative Albanian 
and Turkish political leaders conflicted directly with one another in regards to the 
direction of the Empire. Both the CUP and Albanian nationalists wanted to cultivate 
strong nations, however the CUP asserted that the Ottoman Empire as a whole would 
have to centralize politically and culturally, in a sense transforming the Ottoman Empire 
into a nation-state, a Turkish nation. On the other hand Albanians wanted to cultivate 
their own nation under a decentralized Ottoman Empire. Thus, it was the very fact that 
the CUP and Albanian nationalists agreed on what made a nation, which made their 
parallel nationalist desires irreconcilable. From very early on, the CUP alienated the 
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Albanian political and military groups that they had used to win their revolution. Their 
policy toward the independence of Bulgaria and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the laws they enacted to brutally suppress bands, and their language policy permanently 
alienated Albanians from the Ottoman State. Additionally, it is essential to understand all 
three of these policy approaches as, not only expressions of the CUP’s insistence on their 
total power, but also as indicators of their nationalist ideological bent.  
The first crisis that struck the CUP government occurred in October 1908. On 
October 5th the autonomous province of Bulgaria, declared as such by the Treaties of San 
Stefano and Berlin in 1878, declared its total independence from the Empire. The next 
day Austria-Hungary announced its annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.235 Both of these 
dealings directly violated the terms of the 1878 Berlin Treaty. Oddly, the reaction of the 
CUP government to a foreign power violating an internationally recognized treaty and 
absconding with a sizeable portion of their territory was anything but severe. They half-
heartedly encouraged a boycott of Austro-Hungarian goods, but there was an overall lack 
of palpable outrage. Albanians, on the other hand, were outraged. Bolstered by an extant 
anti-Austrian sentiment, Albanians understood the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
a potential threat to their territorial integrity.236 Ismail Kemal, who was campaigning as a 
candidate in the election of the new parliament at the time, wrote,  
I was puzzled to know what would be the attitude of the officers of the Turkish Army representing 
the Committee of Union and Progress in face of these serious events. The country, greatly shaken, 
manifested frank indignation against Austria, which it showed by entirely boycotting that country 
commercially. But the representatives of the Committee did no more than announce that there was 
nothing extraordinary in these events…the committee was not at all disposed to offer any 
resistance in the matter…Their object was to ensure the triple advantage of obtaining popularity 
for themselves throughout the country, discrediting the former Statesmen, of whom they wanted to 
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get rid at all costs, and using this political liquidation as a means of ridding the country of foreign 
influence, so as to be able to apply their policy of racial unification with the utmost vigor.237  
 
 For Ismail Kemal, and many other Albanians, the CUP’s reaction to this massive 
loss of territory was dubious. The CUP, according to Ismail Kemal, found an opportunity 
in the annexation crisis to truncate portions of the Empire that were historically unruly, 
disloyal and solidly attached to the influence of foreign powers. For Albanians and other 
groups in the empire this loss of territory was seen as a significant blow to the diversity 
of the Empire, giving the CUP catre blanche to homogenize and centralize their power in 
the remaining territories. Additionally, for Albanians, there was a symbolic importance 
attached to Bosnia’s annexation, in that the events at Ferizovik were motivated by a fear 
of a rumored Austria-Hungarian territorial advancement. This became a real threat to 
Albanians by October 1908. The loss of Bosnia and Bulgaria reignited Albanian fears 
regarding their territorial integrity, reignited memories of both Ferizovik and the Treaty 
of San Stefano.  
 Between 1908 and 1909 the CUP had solidified its power in the new Ottoman 
state and its relationship with Albanian political leaders worsened. This culminated in a 
law that the CUP passed in November 1909, which was received as a direct attack on the 
political and cultural rights of Albanians. This “Law on Associations” or “Law on the 
Bands” required a six-month prison sentence for anyone that carried or kept arms, a ten-
year sentence for members of bands, death to any leaders or organizers of bands, and in 
the latter two cases the individual’s entire family would be subject to punishment and his 
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property confiscated.238 Ismail Kemal, who was a member of parliament when this 
proposal was passed, wrote,  
It seemed to me a singularly retrograde law in a country which had joined the concert of the 
European Powers and was supposed to be modeling its customs upon those of liberal countries. 
The drastic law upon the bands was even more barbarous because it enacted that if any one 
member of a family joined these bands, the whole family should be exiled and their goods 
confiscated; so that a whole village might be penalized for the act of one member of the 
community. The main object of the Committee in making this law was simply to get the entire 
power into their hands in order to act with severity against the different nations, especially 
Albanians.239 
 
 His insight is important, because for Albanians, this law both disempowered the 
very political organizations that had militarized for the revolution, and attacked certain 
foundational institutions of Albanian society. For instance, when Ismail Kemal wrote that 
entire villages could be punished, he was not exaggerating. The tribal system that existed 
throughout northern Albania, and had existed for centuries before Ottoman rule, 
resembled these so-called bands, in the sense that the almost every male tribesman 
carried a rifle, and often entire villages belonged to one family. Thus, since the north was 
a particularly politically militant area, the CUP could target huge portions of the Albanian 
population with lengthy prison sentences, property confiscations and even direct 
violence. Albanians had thus interpreted the measure as a justification for CUP brutality 
and a direct attack on their political agency, their cultural identity and social institutions. 
Indeed, for many Albanians the CUP was, by no means, simply ensuring security or even 
asserting its new political power, many of its measures constituted direct attacks on 
Albanian society.  
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Since the CUP dominated political life in the Empire, both in Istanbul and even, 
for the most part, at the local level, Albanians began to permanently reassess their 
relationship to the Ottoman state. As Ismail Kemal wrote,  
The Young Turks [CUP] who saw in the Albanians merely a Mussulman people having no 
political ideal beyond a desire to avoid the payment of taxes, were convinced that by management 
and the exertion of pressure they would become docile and common ottomans, and would serve as 
an example for the other nationalities…On the contrary, the aggressive policy of the Young Turks 
was the leaven that caused their national sentiments to revive and flourish afresh.240 
 
Albanians, particularly those that had joined the CUP’s ranks during the 
revolution, felt betrayed. The CUP was astute in manipulating Albanian nationalist bands, 
as discussed above. They sent Albanian-speaking representatives to talk of Ottomanism, 
liberty, and equality to these bands, all the while maintaining their aspirations of 
centralization and “Turkification.” Admittedly, it is important to approach retrospective 
narratives, like that of Ismail Kemal’s memoir, with critical distance, as he had a 
particular aversion to the CUP. However, by most accounts the CUP had indeed betrayed 
the type of Ottomanism that they purported to espouse during the revolution. It was not 
only Albanians that were let down, but also Armenians, Arabs, Greeks, conservative 
Muslims, Liberals and many others.241  
There is another important point in the passage above. That is, Albanians were 
considered especially vital to the CUP’s centralization and “Turkification” program, as 
they were predominantly Muslim. For the CUP, Albanian autonomy would be considered 
an unacceptable failure of centralization, as Albania was one of the last strongholds of the 
Ottoman Empire in Europe. However it may have been these very policies that 
encouraged full-fledged Albanian irredentism. The CUP leadership publicized the 
policies against bands as, primarily, a matter of national safety, and secondarily as a 
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policy of centralization required to transform the Empire into a modern state.242 The CUP 
language policies, on the other hand, could be described as nothing but an effort to 
culturally and politically disenfranchise Albanians in an effort to culturally homogenize 
the Empire.  
It was the on the issue of language in particular, about which Albanians and the 
CUP were absolutely irreconcilable. Albanian nationalists had always made language a 
central issue. In every document analyzed in the last section, cultivating the Albanian 
language was considered the primary means for the Albanian nation to obtain political 
and cultural agency. The CUP in a very similar sense could only envision a political and 
cultural centralization of their power in the Ottoman state by adopting an inexorable 
policy in regards to the Ottoman language. This policy, ironically, was undoubtedly 
formulated in light of linguistic studies written by Sami Frashëri and his peers in the 
intellectual journals and newspapers circulating before the revolution.  
Additionally, many of the leaders of the CUP were Muslims from the Balkans, 
where, as minorities, their religion had always been an indicator of their identity as 
“Turks” to their Christian counter-parts. The “Turkishness” (Türklük) of their identity had 
been imposed on them at the hands of external forces, and they and their families had 
always been associated intrinsically with the Ottoman state.243 In this sense, it is not of 
much wonder that the CUP had an interest in augmenting the Turkic identity of the 
Empire. Yusuf Akçura was a Tatar born in the Russian Empire and yet he identified 
himself as a Muslim, an Ottoman and a Turk. For Muslim minorities on the borders of the 
Empire, “Turkishness” was imposed on them, and yet many readily identified with Turks 
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and the Ottoman Empire. In the setting of the Balkans or Caucuses, where non-Muslims 
and non-Turks dominated demographically, these identities were blurred into one, that of 
“Turk.”244  Thus, the CUP had developed notions of early Pan-Turkism (tevhid-i etrâk)245 
that manifested in a policy of cultural centralization or “Turkification” in the Empire. 
Monolithic linguistic unity was an essential component of nationalism and, thus, 
the CUP’s post-revolutionary Turkism, in which they promoted the use of Ottoman-
Turkish in every official capacity, including education.246 Even in its most liberal public 
statements the CUP was unflinching in the uncompromised centrality of the Ottoman-
Turkish language:  
The Ottoman nation is a body created by the incorporation of various peoples such as Turks, 
Arabs, Albanians, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Jews…who possess different 
religions and nationalities. Although these peoples have different languages of their own their 
official language is the same. It is the Ottoman language. 247 
 
While this rhetoric connotes a deference to Ottomanism, if still imbued with the 
CUP’s centralizing ambitions. Other statements leave no doubt about the Turkism 
imbedded in the CUP’s language policy, which recalls Sami Frashëri’s arguments for 
augmenting the Turkish elements of the Ottoman language and eliminating those non-
Turkish elements from it.  
Our language is Turkish. Because under the banner of evolution there existed various elements, 
they have gradually gained the title of Ottoman. It is necessary that domination in language belong 
to the Turk, just as national domination belongs to the Turks, for the sake of union and 
advancement. Thus the Ottoman elements must unite linguistically and understand that they will 
render services to the fatherland only through this linguistic union.248 
 
In terms of their relationship with Albanian nationalists, who were similarly 
obstinate in asserting their linguistic identity, the CUP promulgated a number of severe 
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policies to establish the cultural dominance of the Ottoman-Turkish language. In March 
1910, the CUP encouraged the şehülislam to issue a fetva banning the use of the Latin 
alphabet in printing the Albanian language. Furthermore, all publications using Latin 
script were banned and declared illegal.249While not as severe, this action struck an eerie 
resemblance, for Albanians, to Abdülhamid II’s use of the şehülislam to issue a fetva 
preventing printing in the Albanian language all together, and was received with similar 
indignation. In that same year, Albanian-language schools in central and southern 
Albania were closed en masse.  It is difficult to appraise these measures as merely 
pragmatic tools of strengthening the Empire. These policies were expressions of the 
CUP’s stronghold of political and military power and considered direct attacks on 
Albanians, their culture, and their institutions.  
The CUP’s repression of the Albanian language, Albanian political and 
intellectual organizations, and Albanian cultural institutions was indicative of the 
nationalist, homogenizing nature of their centralization program. Still, the preemptory 
nature of this repression also pointed to the CUP’s insecurity in regards to the Albanian 
political situation. As Ismail Kemal observed,  
The Committee now devoted all their efforts to consolidating power, their directing policy being 
to set aside any opposing elements either from persons or from nations that might seek to resist or 
check their influence, as also to bring under their entire control the financial and economical 
administration of the country. The ethnical element which to them seemed the strongest and most 
dangerous was the Albanian People…nothing was neglected that could foment trouble, and all 
kinds of repressive measures were resorted to with the sole aim of crushing what was believed to 
be the head of the Nationalist Medusa.250 
 
Nevertheless, in many ways the Albanian national movement and the CUP 
wanted the same things, which is not surprising as both movements developed out of very 
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similar circumstantial and ideological foundations. In reality, both movements wanted the 
ability to have interpretive authority over the meaning of Ottomanism. The CUP had not 
only gained that authority politically and militarily in the revolution, but also had an 
established association between their identity as Turks and the Ottoman state. On the 
other hand, Albanians wanted a modernized version of the pre-tanzimât Ottoman 
governing ideology. This was, perhaps unrealistically, a decentralized Ottomanism that 
embraced the Empire’s status as a state that governed many distinct nations and allowed 
those nations political and cultural autonomy.  
Still, the CUP’s repressive tactics did betray both the people that had spilt blood 
enacting the revolution and the ideas that the revolution had purported to espouse. 
However before completely indicting the CUP as destroying Ottomanism and the “pure” 
ideas of the revolution, it is important to recognize the precarious position of any new 
revolutionary government. Without exonerating the CUP, it is possible to see their 
insistence on cultural and political centralization as tactically necessary, in light of the 
instability precipitated by widespread irredentism encouraged by foreign powers. Many 
of these same concerns had motivated Albanian nationalists, who internalized the 
international political situation and acted out of concern for their territorial, socio-
political, and cultural integrity. Thus, it was the very fact that Turkish and Albanian 
nationalists existed in the same historical context, that they developed very similar 
nationalist ideologies, which eventually came to exclude one another.  
The key differentiation, however, lies in each respective group’s vision for the 
future of the Empire. Even in some of their most radical views, Albanian nationalists 
seemed to always allow for the possibility of a connection to the Ottoman Empire. 
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Indeed, after 1908, Albanians were so excited by the revolution that they wanted mere 
administrative autonomy within the Ottoman imperial system. It was the CUP’s 
conception that cultural centralization, in the form of “Turkification,” was instrumental to 
their political centralization of power that destroyed the Albanians’ understanding of 
Ottomanism. This conception, which understood the cultural, particularly the ethno-
linguistic, composition of a society as integral to its political power, can be described as 
nothing else but nationalist.  
It is important to recognize that there was by no means a consensus among Turks, 
or Ottomans for that matter, as to the CUP’s power or its program of centralization. The 
so-called Liberal Union, of which Ismail Kemal and Prince Sabaheddin were leaders, had 
opposed many of the CUP’s policies. When a coup d’état was staged in April 1909, 
briefly removing the CUP from power, it was Ismail Kemal who briefly took on a 
leadership role.251 However, these acts of opposition only encouraged the CUP’s 
abrogation of power. By the end of 1909 the CUP had not only reclaimed back power, 
but also won a substantial majority in the parliament, had 360 active branches throughout 
the Empire, over 800,000 members and a stronghold over the Ottoman bureaucratic 
structure.252  
What the CUP had most likely not expected, was the exponential intensity with 
which Albanians would oppose their rule, in spite of increasingly brutal military 
repressions. By the beginning of 1911, sporadic revolts had turned into widespread 
insurrections throughout Albania. When Italy had invaded Libya in September 1911, 
Albanian militant groups saw an opportunity to augment their effort. Additionally, the 
                                                
251 Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution : The Young Turks, 1902-1908, 285. 
252 Ibid., 288. 
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Liberal Union and parties like Hürriyet ve Itilâf Fırkası (Party of Freedom and Accord), 
which advocated for decentralization and concessions to Albanians, floundered in the 
1912 elections. Finally, the First Balkan War broke out in October 1912, and the fact that 
a military conglomeration of Bulgarians, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Greeks began to 
attack Ottoman territory added an urgency that affirmed, for Albanians, there was no 
going back to the status quo.253  
The direction of the new policy of the Ottoman Empire was formally sealed…these gloomy 
previsions, and the general discontent caused by the Tripolitan war, forced Albania to a general 
rising. The savage obstinacy of the Young Turks [CUP] in their attempt to absorb the nationalities 
had made our resistance inevitable and compelled us to fight for our national life. Challenged and 
attacked as we were in our existence as a people, though we felt how much thus struggle would be 
contrary to our unabated desire to stand by the Empire, had we not above all things a right to work 
out our own salvation? The general rising and the triumphal entry of the chiefs of all the tribes into 
Uskub put an end to the extravagant and criminal power of the Young Turks [CUP] and brought 
about the dissolution of the Chamber…I realized that the time had arrived for us Albanians to take 
vigorous measures for our own salvation.254 
 
Ismail Kemal sent telegrams to leaders all over Albania, calling on them to attend 
an urgent conference. Eighty-three Albanians, Muslim and Christian, Gheg and Tosk, 
convened a conference in the town of Vlorë on November 15th. At the conference, Ismail 
Kemal made a basic and pragmatic argument for independence, informing the delegates 
that Serbian armies had already taken Albanian cities in the northeast. He told the 
delegates that despite their long-standing loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, only the 
formation of an independent Albanian state could safeguard their territorial integrity. On 
November 28th 1912, Ismail Kemal stood on the balcony of his family home in Vlorë and 
proclaimed Albania’s independence using the standard of Skanderbeg, the folkloric hero 
of Albania, as the new countries flag (See Appendix D.1). The text of the proclamation of 
independence was as follows,  
In Vlora, on the 15th/28th of November 1328/1912. 
                                                
253 Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912, 424-26. 
254 Vlora, The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, 370-71. 
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Following the speech made by the President, Ismail Kemal Bey, in which he spoke of the great 
perils facing Albania today, the delegates have all decided unanimously that Albania, as of today, 
should be on her own, free and independent.255 
 
Furthermore, Ismail Kemal, as the elected president of the provisional 
government, sent telegrams to each European Power and the Sublime Porte, like this one, 
sent to the British consulate: 
The National Assembly, consisting of delegates from all parts of Albania, without 
distinction of religion, who have today met in the town of Valona [Vlorë], have proclaimed the 
political independence of Albania and constituted a Provisional Government entrusted with the 
task of defending the rights of the Albanian people, menaced with extermination by the Serbian 
Armies, and of freeing the national soil invaded by foreign foes. In bringing these facts to the 
knowledge of Your Excellency, I have the honor to ask the Government of His Britannic Majesty 
to recognize this change in the political life of the Albanian nation. 
The Albanians, who have entered into the family of the peoples of Eastern Europe, of 
whom they flatter themselves that they are the eldest, are pursuing one only aim, to live in peace 
with all the Balkan States and become an element of equilibrium. They are convinced that the 
Government of His Majesty, as well as the whole civilized world, will accord them a benevolent 
welcome by protecting them against all attacks on their national existence and against any 
dismemberment of their territory.256  
 
 This telegram documents Ismail Kemal’s diplomatic dexterity, exploiting the 
European powers’ concerns in regards to the recent mass militarization of the Balkans. 
First, he was sure to demonstrate, immediately, the secular nature of the new government, 
precluding the possibility of European powers rejecting his appeal under the guise of 
concern for Albanian Christians. He subsequently refers to the European concept of 
national rights urging the powers to recognize “the Rights of the Albanian people.” Most 
importantly, he writes of the issue of the balance of power in the Balkans. By referring to 
Serbian military avarice, Ismail Kemal draws upon Britain’s anxiety in regards to the 
expansion of Russian influence in the region, which had already proved significant. 
Ismail Kemal offered Albania as a stabilizing force against Pan-Slavism, in which he 
welcomes Britain to vest political interest.  
                                                
255 "Shpallja E Pavarësisë Së Shqipërisë (the Declaration of Independence of Albania) ", in 
Dokumenta Historike Për T'i Shërbye Historiës Tone Kombëtare. Tirana: Instituti I Historisë ed. 
Lef Nosi and translated by Robert Elsie (Tirana: Instituti i Historisë 2007), 99, 176-79. 
256 ———, The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, 372. 
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At the behest of Ismail Kemal, British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey initiated 
a conference between Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Italy on 
December 17th 1912. The Conference of London met fifty-four times, debating both 
Albania’s potential administrative relationship with the Ottoman Empire, as well as its 
territorial boundaries. On July 29th 1913, a formal decision was made. Albania was to 
lose a substantial part of its territory, particularly Kosovo, to Serbia, Montenegro and 
Greece, but it would be an independent state.  
 However, Albania’s independence was only formal. In fact, while independent of 
from the Ottoman Empire, Albania was politically and administratively dependent on the 
powers of Europe. It was decided that Albania would become a hereditary monarchy 
based on primogeniture and the Powers designated the king, a common pattern in the 
Balkans by this point. Their choice, a German royal called Prince Wilhelm of Wied, 
proved a disastrous one as Albanians, particularly Muslims, rebelled against his reign. 
Additionally, the Conference of London declared that, “The control of the civil 
administration and finances of Albania is to be given over to an International 
Commission composed of the delegates of the six Powers and one delegate from 
Albania.”257  
Thus, even in its new state of independence, Albania’s political destiny was still 
managed by outsiders. Ismail Kemal’s enthusiastic reliance on Europe to determine 
Albania’s future proved, in the end, to prolong Albania’s frustrated national aspirations.  
With its ties to the Ottoman Empire, its former guardian, formally severed, Albania was 
at the whim of the European international power contest. It was with this feeling of 
                                                
257 "Eleven Points for the Basis of International Recognition for Albanian Independence,"  
(Conference of London: translated from the French by Robert Elsie, July 29 1913). 
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insecurity that Ismail Kemal wrote the last words of his memoir, this foreboding passage, 
written shortly before the First World War, reads,  
The reconstitution of the Balkanic bloc and the guarantee of its independence will be one of the 
most efficacious factors for the peace of the East and the world. This Balkan edifice can only be 
consolidated with and by the consolidation of Albania, which forms its fourth supporting 
column.258  
                                                
258 ———, The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, 386. 




The process in which the political motivations of Albanians and Turks came to 
oppose one another illuminates the some of the most significant meta-historical 
transformations in the late Ottoman Empire. The fundamental contingencies, broad 
ideological trends, and meta-historical, socio-political forces that shaped late Ottoman 
history shaped these political motivations, as they manifested in the Albanian national 
movement and the Committee of Union and Progress. The responses of Albanian and 
Turkish political actors to these key contingencies, like the Treaty of San Stefano, the 
policies of Abdülhamid II, irredentist movements in the Balkans, and the Empire’s 
struggle to defend its borders, fell into existing structural ideologies like nationalism and 
constitutionalism. However, the contextual particularity of the Ottoman Empire and the 
multi-vocal identities of Albanian and Turks imbued these political actors with the 
agency to affect the essence of these structural ideologies, as they manifested in their 
respective political movements. Thus, Albanian and Turkish nationalisms were multi-
faceted, unique, and even paradoxical.  
The manner in which Albanian and Turkish political actors resolved the 
contradictions, with which they were faced, brought an end to an exceptional Ottoman-
Albanian synergistic coexistence. Indeed, Albanians and Turks, for a time, triumphed 
over ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions, in favor of, what had become by the 
revolution, the open-ended concept of Ottomanism. While Ottomanism was derived from 
the unique model of the adaptive administration of a multi-cultural Empire, its meaning 
was, during this period, somewhat ambiguous. Indeed, Albanians understood the 1908 
revolution as contiguous with what they conceived of as a tradition of adaptive flexibility 
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embodied by Ottomanism. The constitution, they hoped, would guarantee them cultural 
and political rights sustained by a decentralized, yet strong Empire of nations.  
However, it soon came to light that the CUP strove to make Ottomanism a 
dynamic form of Turkism. That is, the CUP used Ottomanism as a pretext to implement 
cultural centralization, to “Turkify” the Ottoman population, and they were willing to use 
repressive tactics to do so. For Albanians, this recalled Abdülhamid’s repressive policies, 
which he implemented under the guise of his Pan-Islamic reconfiguration of Ottomanism, 
and for which Albanians had joined the revolution to oppose. It was with the CUP and its 
refusal to negotiate its political program that delivered Ottomanism, as Albanians 
understood it, its final blow. Thus, in this process of revolutionary structural 
transformation, one of the key battlegrounds was a contest of resurrecting traditions and 
reconstructing their meanings. The CUP’s political success after the revolution gave it 
license to determine the meaning of Ottomanism, leaving Albanian nationalists to 
reconfigure their political aspirations.   
Thus, in understanding the commonalities and differences between Albanian and 
Turkish nationalism, the fluidity of nationalism as a politically institutionalized reflection 
of identity becomes more apparent. Indeed, nationalism has certain consistent structures, 
but these manifest in exceedingly diverse ways depending on a multiplicity of 
contingencies and the meanings that social actors apply to them. In Imagined 
Communities, Benedict Anderson portrays nationalism as a product of modernity, as an 
ideology that replaced religion as “enlightened” revolutions toppled ancient institutions, 
replacing them with secular, rational, modern states.259 Yet this paradigm is complicated 
                                                
259 Benedict  Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Revised and Extended ed. (London: Verso, 2006). 
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when one analyzes the Ottoman Empire. The contextual distinctiveness of the Ottoman 
imperial framework lends itself to the unique development of nationalisms. While the 
manifestation of nationalism within the Ottoman framework was a structural shift in 
ideology from Ottomanism to ethno-linguistic nationalism, these peculiarities fashioned 
each nationalism uniquely, one was secular, the other religious, one irredentist, the other 
advocating centralization, but both ultimately excluding the other in its vision for a 









A map of territories annexed to Montenegro as proposed by the Treaty of San Stefano. (Source: 
Hertslet, Sir Edward. The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and 
Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814. London: 
Butterworths 1891, p. 2674) 
 




A map of territories annexed to Serbia as proposed by the Treaty of San Stefano. (Source: 
Hertslet, Sir Edward. The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and 
Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814. London: 






















A map of territories annexed to the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria as proposed by the 
Treaty of San Stefano. (Source: Hertslet, Sir Edward. The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the 
Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place since the General Peace of 














Text of the Kanun as it was originally codified in the Old Albanian language. (Source: Kanuni i 
Lekë Dukagjinit (the Code of Lekë Dukagjini). Translated by Leonard Fox. Edited by Shtjefën 
Gjeçov. New York Gjonlekaj Publishing Company 1989.)  
 
 





Sami’s article as it appeared in the original Ottoman Turkish, signed by the author. (Source: 
Sami, Şemseddin. "Lisân Ve Edebiyatımız " In Şemseddin Sami’nin Kaleminden Dil Ve Edebiyat 
Meseleleri (Issues of Language and Literature from the Pen of Şemseddin Sami) by Hüseyin 










This is a photograph of Ismail Kemal (in the center of the balcony with a white beard and wearing 
a fes), announcing the declaration of Albanian independence. Notice that Ismail Kemal and most 
of the men on the balcony wear the Ottoman fes, while those in the crowd wear the Albanian 
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